J.A.M., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
J.A.M., a student suspended for having a weapon on school property, attended his school's homecoming dance on October 10 while allegedly under suspension. The court reversed his trespass conviction because the evidence showed his suspension did not begin until October 12, meaning he was not 'currently under suspension' when he entered the campus for the dance.
The court reversed J.A.M.'s trespass conviction and remanded with directions to dismiss the charge because the evidence failed to show he was currently under suspension when he arrived on October 10. The written referral clearly showed his suspension began on Monday, October 12, and ended on October 26, which did not include the weekend of October 10.
[1] A student is not guilty of trespass on school property under section 810.097(1)(b), Florida Statutes, if the student is not currently under suspension when entering the c…
[2] A written suspension referral form specifying out-of-school suspension dates dictates the period of suspension, even if the issuing administrator mistakenly believes the…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As prescribed by the written referral, J.A.M.'s suspension began on Monday, October 12, and it ended on Monday, October 26. That period spanned ten school days and two weekends — but not the weekend just after the October 9 referral. Therefore, the evidence failed to show that J.A.M. was currently under suspension when he arrived on campus to attend the dance on October 10.”
This quote establishes the factual basis for reversal—the suspension dates in the written referral did not include October 10, so J.A.M. was not under suspension at the time he entered the campus.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn October 9, J.A.M. was given a ten-day out-of-school suspension from high school for carrying a weapon on campus, with suspension dates listed as 10…
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J.A.M. argues that the State failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove that he committed trespass by entering school property while under suspension. We agree and reverse the order finding him guilty of that charge.
On Friday, October 9, J.A.M. was given a ten-day suspension from high school for having a weapon on campus. The discipline referral form set forth the out-of-school suspension dates as “10/12-10/26.” The following was also stamped on the form: “MAY NOT BE ON SCHOOL CAMPUS OR ANY PASCO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD PROPERTY DURING OUT OF SCHOOL SUSPENSION. TRESPASSING COULD RESULT IN AN ARREST.” According to the assistant principal who signed the referral, he brought this provision to J.A.M.’s attention on October 9 and gave him a copy of the referral form. The homecoming dance was held the next evening, on Saturday, October 10. When J.A.M. and his date arrived at school for the dance, he was asked to leave.
J.A.M. was later charged in a delinquency petition with trespass on school property in violation of section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2009). Under this statute, trespass is committed by any person who “[i]s a student currently under suspension or expulsion[] and who enters or remains upon the campus.” § 810.097(l)(b).
In his testimony, the assistant principal asserted that J.A.M.’s suspension began when the referral was issued on October 9, but he did not say that he explained this to J.A.M. In any event, he was mistaken. As prescribed by the written referral, J.A.M.’s suspension began on Monday, October 12, and it ended on Monday, October 26. That period spanned ten school days and two weekends — but not the weekend just after the October 9 referral. Therefore, the evidence failed to show that J.A.M. was currently under suspension when he arrived on campus to attend the dance on October 10.
J.A.M. raised this issue below in a motion for judgment of acquittal, more properly characterized as a motion for judgment of dismissal under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(k). The circuit court denied the motion and found J.A.M. guilty of the trespassing charge. The court withheld adjudication and placed J.A.M. on probation. We have reviewed the matter de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Having concluded that the State failed to submit competent, substantial evidence that J.A.M. entered school property while “currently under suspension,” we reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the charge. See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002) (directing appellate courts to apply de novo standard when reviewing denial of motion for judgment of acquittal and to reverse only when convic*817tion was not supported by competent, substantial evidence); C.E.L. v. State, 995 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (stating that judgment of acquittal standard applies to review of motion for judgment of dismissal in juvenile case).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
DAVIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002)
- C.E.L. v. State, 995 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)