MARCUS LEVERETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant's burglary conviction reversed because the State failed to prove the initial entry was without consent, as required under Florida law for a 'remaining in' burglary charge.
A conviction for burglary based on remaining in a dwelling with intent to commit a forcible felony requires proof that the initial entry was without the occupant's consent.
[1] A burglary conviction based on remaining in a dwelling, structure, or conveyance with intent to commit a forcible felony requires proof that the initial entry was without…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarcus Leverett was convicted by jury of burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery and other offenses. The defendant challenged the burglary conv…
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Marcus Leverett (defendant) appeals his judgments and sentences which were entered by the trial court after a jury found him guilty of numerous offenses, including one count of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery. The defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge because the record demonstrates the State failed to present any evidence indicating that the victims had consented to his initial entry into the premises. The State properly concedes error on this issue, acknowledging that this court’s decision in the case involving the defendant’s co-defendant controls. See Harris v. State, 48 So.3d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that the statute defining burglary to include remaining in a dwelling, structure, or conveyance “notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry” with intent to commit a forcible felony required that the initial entry into the dwelling, structure, or conveyance be with the consent of the occupants and, therefore, Harris, who had pushed his way into the victim’s apartment after knocking on the door, could not be convicted of a “remaining in” burglary). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction and sentence on the burglary charge are reversed. On all other issues, we affirm.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
LAWSON and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.