PHYLLIS WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL A. WALKER, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2012-02-29
No. 4D10-5158
GROSS, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ, concur.
80 So. 3d 1128 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2012) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In a post-divorce modification case, the circuit court dismissed Phyllis Walker's petition to convert rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth District reversed, holding that Florida law vests circuit courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony awards regardless of whether the original judgment expressly reserved such jurisdiction.


Holding

A circuit court has continuing subject matter jurisdiction under Florida law to modify an alimony award, including converting the nature of the award and extending the payment period, regardless of whether the original judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction was the issue in Stickney, not subject matter jurisdiction, and because Phyllis was properly served with notice, the court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.


Headnotes

[1] A circuit court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce and modify an alimony award, even if not expressly reserved in the final judgment.

[2] Statutory provisions empowering a court to modify an order of support allow for changes in the nature of an award and extensions of payment periods.

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Key Quotes

“Chapter 61 vests a circuit court with continuing jurisdiction to enforce and modify an alimony award.”

Establishes the statutory basis for the court's jurisdiction to hear modification petitions

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Facts & Procedural History

Phyllis and Daniel Walker were divorced on July 15, 2003, with the final judgment providing for Daniel to pay Phyllis rehabilitative alimony for 10 ye…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Phyllis and Daniel Walker were divorced on July 15, 2003. Incorporating the parties’ marital settlement agreement, the final judgment of dissolution provided that Daniel was to pay Phyllis rehabilitative alimony for 10 years. The judgment reserved jurisdiction to “modify and enforce” the judgment.

On August 27, 2008, Phyllis filed a petition for modification of alimony seeking to convert the rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony and to increase the amount of the award. The summons on the petition was served on Daniel. He answered and later moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the motion, relying on Stickney v. Stickney, 377 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

Chapter 61 vests a circuit court with continuing jurisdiction to enforce and modify an alimony award. See § 61.14(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Wiele v. Kadzis, 915 So.2d 777, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Section 61.14(l)(a), which allows a court to “modify an order of support, maintenance or alimony,” empowers a court to change the nature of an award and extend the period for payment. See Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So.2d 228, 229 n. 4 *1129(Fla. 3d DCA 1982); O’Neal v. O’Neal, 410 So.2d 1369, 1371 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Circuit courts have the subject matter jurisdiction to consider timely petitions for such modification, whether or not the court has expressly reserved jurisdiction in a final judgment. See Pujals, 414 So.2d at 229.

Due process requires that the party against whom relief is sought have “reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.” Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959). Stickney, upon which the trial court relied, was a case involving personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. There, the final judgment awarded rehabilitative alimony. Stickney, 377 So.2d at 188. The former wife served the former husband with a petition for modification by mail. Id. Because the final judgment did not “reserve or retain jurisdiction to award permanent alimony in the future,” the first district held that the former wife should have proceeded under a rule of procedure “which requires new service of process.” Id. The holding of Stickney was that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the former husband, not that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for modification. In this case, personal jurisdiction was not at issue; the husband was personally served with the petition.

The circuit court had the personal and subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the petition for modification. We reverse the order of dismissal and remand to the circuit court to consider the petition on the merits.

GROSS, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Clark v. Clark, 204 So. 3d 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
    …ntinuance of the hearing on the motion because the record reflects the Former Wife did not have adequate time to prepare for the hearing since she did not even receive notice of the proceeding until the week before the healing. See Walker v. Walker, 80 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quot [*593] ing Kosch v. Kosch) 113 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959)) (“Due process requires that the party against whom relief is sought have ‘reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.’ ”); Conner v. Conner, 800 So.…
  • Adele Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
    …ition with the same court. Although the trial court stated in its order granting the motion to dismiss that "there is no specific reservation of Subject Matter Jurisdiction to modify alimony," such reservation is not required. See Walker v. Walker , 80 So. 3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Because the statute grants the court the power to hear the case and because Former Wife filed the supplemental petition in the same court where the final judgments were executed, the trial court did have subject matter jur…
  • Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
    …n with the same court. Although the trial court stated in its order granting the motion to dismiss that “there is no specific reservation of Subject Matter Jurisdiction to modify alimony,” such reservation is not required. See Walker v. Walker, 80 So. 3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Because the statute grants the court the power to hear the case and because Former Wife filed the supplemental petition in the same court where the final judgments were executed, the trial court did have subject matter…

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