THOMAS E. JORDAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Jordan's rule 3.800(a) postconviction motion was granted by the first trial judge, requiring resentencing. After the judge's death, a second judge improperly reconsidered and denied the motion 77 days later based on an untimely motion for reconsideration. The appellate court quashed the second judge's order and reinstated the first judge's grant of the motion, finding the second judge lacked jurisdiction to reconsider a final order outside the 15-day window.
The second judge lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the first judge's order granting the rule 3.800(a) motion because the State's motion for reconsideration was untimely under rule 3.800(b)(1)(B). A final order granting postconviction relief can only be challenged by timely motion for rehearing or appeal, and once that window closes, the order becomes unreviewable by the same court.
[1] A motion for reconsideration of a final order in a postconviction proceeding is untimely if not filed within the time prescribed by rule 3.800(b)(1)(B).
[2] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion for reconsideration that is not timely filed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The order entered by the first judge granting Appellant's rule 3.800(a) motion was a final order because it brought the postconviction proceeding to an end.”
Establishes that orders granting postconviction relief are final and can only be challenged through timely procedures
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJordan had previously appealed a denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion, and this court reversed and remanded in Jordan v. State, 32 So.3d 727 (Fla. 1st D…
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This is the second time that Appellant has appealed an order ruling on the same underlying rule 3.800(a) motion. In Jordan v. State, 32 So.3d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), we reversed and remanded the order denying the motion because the trial court failed to attach documents conclusively refuting Appellant’s facially sufficient claim. Upon remand the trial court granted the motion and stated that a separate hearing would be held to resentence Appellant. Before resentencing, however, the trial judge passed away.
Seventy-seven days after the order granting the motion was entered, the State filed a motion for reconsideration raising the same arguments it had raised prior to the first judge’s granting the motion. Over Appellant’s objection, the second judge reconsidered and then denied the motion. Appellant timely appealed.
Appellant argues that the second judge lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the order entered by the first judge. We issued a Toler1 order directing the State to show cause why the second judge’s order should not be quashed and the case remanded for resentencing in accordance with the first judge’s order because the State’s motion for reconsideration was untimely under rule 3.800(b)(1)(B).2 The State filed a response “conceding] that the motion for reconsideration was untimely and the court was therefore without jurisdiction to rule upon it.”
We accept the State’s concession of error. The order entered by the first judge granting Appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion was a final order because it brought the postconviction proceeding to an end. See State v. White, 470 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1985) (explaining that the state may appeal an order granting postconviction relief because the order brings the collateral proceeding to an end); and cf. Jones v. State, 35 so.3d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (explaining that a resentencing after a successful rule 3.800(a) motion is a de novo proceeding); but cf. State v. Huerta, 38 So.3d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Adams v. State, 949 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); State v. Rudolf, 821 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); State v. Delvalle, 745 So.2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Accordingly, the order was subject to challenge only by way of a timely motion for rehearing or an appeal. Cf. Lormeus v. State, 10 So.3d 190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (noting that an order granting the defendant’s rule 3.800(a) motion was not final for double jeopardy purposes because the state filed a timely motion for rehearing under rule 3.800(b)(1)(B)); § 924.066(2), Fla. Stat. (authorizing both the state and the prisoner to appeal an adverse ruling granting or denying collateral relief).
Here, as the State properly concedes, the motion seeking reconsideration of the first judge’s order was not timely filed and, thus, the second judge lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. Accordingly, we quash the order on appeal and remand with directions that the trial court reinstate the first judge’s order granting Appellant’s postconviction motion and then resentence Appellant.
*597QUASHED and REMANDED with directions.
MARSTILLER and SWANSON, JJ„ concur; WETHERELL, J., concurs in result only.
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Cited By (15 total)
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Slocum v. State, 95 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…resented in this appeal,” id., the result was to afford the appellant counsel on all issues. But there was never any question concerning the timeliness of the notice of appeal from the order denying collateral relief in part. . See Jordan v. State, 81 So. 3d 595, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (order granting Jordan's 3.800(a) motion and ordering a separate hearing for resentencing held to be a final order). But see State v. Huerta, 38 So. 3d 883, 884-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (state's time for appeal began to run onc…
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Simmons v. State, 274 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)…cinding the original order. This Court has twice held that an order on a motion for postconviction relief is final and appealable even when resentencing has not occurred. See Slocum v. State, 95 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Jordan v. State, 81 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2 A year later, a plurality of Florida’s supreme court reached the same conclusion. State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018) (holding that a juvenile’s life sentence with the possibility…
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Lamont Taylor v. State, 96 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…r denying in part and granting in part the postconviction claims “finally concluded collateral proceedings” and the resentenc-ing in the original case was a “de novo proceeding ... legally discrete from the collateral proceeding.”); Jordan v. State, 81 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (finding state’s motion for reconsideration filed 77 days after order granting rule 3.800 motion but before resentencing was untimely because order was final, bringing postcon-viction proceeding to an end). We also believe that C…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Toler v. State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- State v. Beauford White, 470 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Rudolf, 821 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- State v. Pompeyo F. Huerta, 38 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- Perez v. State, 745 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Adams v. State, 949 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- State v. Delvalle, 745 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Anderson Lormeus v. State, 10 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
- Jordan v. State, 32 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)