KATHY ANN GARCIA-LAWSON, PH.D., APPELLANT,
v.
JEFFREY P. LAWSON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final order while two interlocutory appeals were pending. The court held that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f) prohibits trial courts from rendering final orders disposing of a case while appeals from non-final orders in the same case are pending, and any order entered in violation of this rule is void.
No. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final judgment because Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f) prohibits a trial court from rendering a final order disposing of a cause while an appeal from a non-final order in the same case is pending. The final judgment is therefore void and must be reversed.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to render a final order disposing of a cause while a non-final appeal from that cause is pending.
[2] An order entered by a trial court without jurisdiction is a nullity.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the absence of a stay, during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.”
Establishes the controlling rule preventing trial courts from entering final judgments while interlocutory appeals are pending.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage on April 29, 2010. At the time the final judgment was entered, two frivolous inter…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Non-Final Order Review cases and more on FLexlaw
The circuit court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage while two frivolous interlocutory appeals were pending, and before this court sua sponte dismissed the appeals. We reverse the final judgment because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to render a final order disposing of the case.
This case is controlled by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f), which provides:
In the absence of a stay, during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.
Courts have interpreted this rule to mean that a trial court lacks the jurisdiction to render a final order while an appeal from a non-final order in the same case is pending and, if the trial court does so, the final order is a nullity. E.g., Dragomirecky v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 891 So.2d 633, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“[A]n order entered without jurisdiction is a nullity, and cannot be considered harmless error.” (citations omitted)); Connor Realty, Inc. v. Ocean Terrace N. Condo. Ass’n, 572 So.2d 4, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[A] trial court may proceed in a cause pending a non-final appeal and dispose of any matter not in form or effect interfering with the power and authority of the appellate court to make its jurisdiction effective, but the trial court may do so only short of final disposition.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
As we wrote in Esposito v. Horning:
This may all sound like legal gobbledegook to some since, upon remand, the trial judge can be expected to re-enter a similar final judgment. We concede that may be true, but jurisdiction is not a question a court can take or leave, and a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void.
416 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (footnote omitted).
Hirschhorn v. Superior Realty of Florida, Inc., 450 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA *1381984), illustrates the operation of Rule 9.130(f). There, this court reversed a final order that had been entered before a pending non-final appeal was dismissed. The trial court entered final judgment on May 10, 1988. Id. at 511. The non-final appeal was not dismissed until July 8, 1983. Id. Accordingly, the court “revers[ed] and remand[ed] this matter for further proceedings which may include reinstatement of the final judgment on a date subsequent to July 8,1983.” Id.
In the instant case, the trial court entered the final judgment on April 29, 2010. This court did not dismiss the non-final appeals until May 25, 2010, and November 18, 2010. As in Hirschhom, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the final judgment, since the non-final appeals were still pending.
We reverse the final judgment and remand the case to the circuit court. We note that, on remand, the trial court is authorized to re-enter the final judgment since the interlocutory appeals that prevented that court from disposing of the case have been resolved with finality.
MAY, C.J., and STEVENSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. ARK Development/Oceanview, LLC, 150 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…t while this case was on appeal from the non-final order dissolving the writ of garnishment, the trial court entered a final judgment in Amy’s favor. The court was without jurisdiction to do so. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(f); Gareia-Lawson v. Lawson, 82 So. 3d 137, 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“[A] trial court lacks jurisdiction to render a final order while an appeal from a non-final order in the same case is pending and, if the trial court does so, the final order is a nullity.”). On remand, the court is direct…
-
Llanso v. Gomez De Cordova, 263 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…mand, the trial court can be expected to re- enter a similar final judgment. We concede that may be true, but jurisdiction is not a question a court can take or leave, and a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void. Garcia-Lawson v. Lawson, 82 So. 3d 137, 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla 4th DCA 1982)).2 Accordingly, we reverse the Final Judgment and subsequent orders and remand for further proceedings. Our reversal, however, is without prejudice t…
-
Denniz Dilican and Lori Dilican v. Normandy Vill. Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 122 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…worthy of discussion. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in entering the final judgment while an appeal of a non-final order in the same case was pending. This argument has merit. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(f); Garcia-Lawson v. Lawson, 82 So. 3d 137, 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Courts have interpreted [Rule 9.130(f) ] to mean that a trial court lacks the jurisdiction to render a final order while an appeal from a non-final order in the same case is pending and, if the trial court does so, the fin…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Connor Realty, Inc. v. Ocean Terrace N. Condo. Ass'n, 572 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Dragomirecky v. Town OF Ponce Inlet, 891 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Hirschhorn v. Superior Realty OF Fla., Inc., 450 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)