DANIEL KANG SHANKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Shanks appealed the trial court's denial of his petition to seal his criminal history record for a cocaine possession charge. The appellate court reversed, holding that when a petitioner satisfies all statutory and rule criteria for sealing records, the trial court must provide a factual basis and good reason for any denial, which was lacking here.
When an applicant satisfies all criteria in Rules 3.692 and 3.989(d), the applicant is presumptively entitled to an order to seal or expunge records. Any denial must be based on sound discretion supported by good reason based on facts and circumstances of the individual case. The trial court's bare denial without any evidentiary hearing or stated reasons was improper.
[1] A trial court's denial of a petition to seal or expunge criminal history records must be based on a good reason supported by the facts and circumstances of the individual…
[2] A trial court cannot deny a petition to seal or expunge criminal history records without providing a factual basis for the denial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[O]nce an applicant satisfies the criteria set forth in Rules 3.692 and 3.989(d), the applicant is presumptively entitled to an order to seal or expunge court records. However, the petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the petition may be denied if there is good reason for denial based on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.”
Establishes the standard that petitioners satisfying all criteria are presumptively entitled to relief unless the court provides good reason for denial
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShanks entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of cocaine in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(a). The trial court withheld adjudicatio…
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When Daniel Shanks petitioned to have his criminal history record sealed, attach*1227ing the requisite affidavit and certificate of eligibility from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, see § 94B.059, Fla. Stat. (2011); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.692, the trial court entered an order denying the petition to seal, stating (apart from formal parts) only: “Having thoroughly reviewed the case and in consideration to the Amended Petition to Seal Criminal History Record, Response, and being fully advised in the premises, this Court denies the Petition to Expunge/Seal, pursuant to F.S. § 943.059.” We reverse and remand.
Earlier Mr. Shanks had entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of possession of cocaine, in violation of section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2009). The trial court withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced him to twelve months’ drug offender probation with the special condition that he complete a six-month recovery program. Upon request of his probation officer, Mr. Shanks’ probation was terminated early. He then filed his petition to expunge or seal, which meets all rule and statutory criteria.
“[Ojnce an applicant satisfies the criteria set forth in Rules 3.692 and 3.989(d), the applicant is presumptively entitled to an order to seal or expunge court records. However, the petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the petition may be denied if there is good reason for denial based on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.” Anderson v. State, 692 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (citation omitted). Here denial in the exercise of sound discretion would have required some good reason based on facts and circumstances of Mr. Shanks’ individual case.
But “[without [any] evidence at [a] hearing or stating any reason for denying [Mr. Shanks’] request in its order, it appears the trial court had no factual basis to support the denial of [Mr. Shanks’] request to seal his records.” Cole v. State, 941 So.2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. See Light v. State, 80 So.3d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Hobbs v. State, 80 So.3d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Baker v. State, 53 So.3d 1147, 1148-49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); VFD v. State, 19 So.3d 1172, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Reversed and remanded.
WETHERELL and RAY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Gotowala v. State, 162 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
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Nelsa McGann Grey v. State, 199 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
Authorities Cited
- Anderson v. State, 692 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- VFD v. State, 19 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Cole v. State, 941 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Baker v. State, 53 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
- Light v. State, 80 So. 3d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
- Hobbs v. State, 80 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)