HOPEWELL, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, JOSEPH CAUTHEN, III, AND JOSEPH CAUTHEN, IV, APPELLANTS,
v.
ALARION BANK, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2012-02-09
No. 1D11-6259
VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
84 So. 3d 1073 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2012) Negative Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellants sought immediate review of an order denying their motion to dismiss, arguing it determined their entitlement to arbitration. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's order did not actually determine the arbitration issue because the court did not construe the motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration.


Holding

The court lacks jurisdiction to review the order because the trial court's order did not determine the appellants' entitlement to arbitration. Although a trial court may construe a motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration, the trial court here did not do so, and dismissal is not required even if claims are subject to arbitration.


Headnotes

[1] An order is immediately appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) only if it necessarily determines a party's entitlement to arbitration.

[2] A trial court may construe a motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration and determine a party's entitlement to arbitration in its order.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A trial court may construe a motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration and make a determination on a party's entitlement to arbitration in its order on the motion [...] Alternatively, a trial court may decide a motion to dismiss that asserts an entitlement to arbitration without reaching the arbitration issue.”

Establishes that trial courts have discretion in how to handle motions to dismiss that raise arbitration defenses

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellants Hopewell, LLC, Joseph Cauthen, III, and Joseph Cauthen, IV filed a motion to dismiss a complaint in which they asserted that the claims wer…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants seek review of a nonfinal “Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Setting Case Management Conference,” entered on October 27, 2011. The appellants argue the order is immediately appealable pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) because it necessarily determined their entitlement to arbitration. However, the order on appeal does not determine the appellants’ entitlement to arbitration and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the order at this time.

The Court’s jurisdiction turns on whether the order on appeal determined the appellants’ entitlement to arbitration. A trial court may construe a motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration and make a determination on a party’s entitlement to arbitration in its order on the motion. See, e.g., S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Alternatively, a trial court may decide a motion to dismiss that asserts an entitlement to arbitration without reaching the arbitration issue. See Weber v. Bonilla-Mathe, 807 So.2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (dismissing appeal from order denying motion to dismiss wherein defendant sought dismissal because plaintiff had not invoked arbitration clause); Southeastern Title and Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 155 So.2d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (dismissing appeal from order denying motion to dismiss wherein defendant’s sole grounds for dismissal was that the claims were subject to arbitration and therefore the plaintiff should be required to exhaust her remedies in arbitration). Similar to the defendant in Curtis, the appellants construe the order on appeal as an order denying a motion to compel arbitration because the underlying motion to dismiss had asserted that the claims raised in the complaint are subject to arbitration. However, even if the claims are subject to arbitration, dismissal of the complaint is not required. See § 682.03(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (2010); Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 391, *1074394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“A stay of judicial proceedings is required when the action involves an issue subject to arbitration, an application for arbitration has been made, and the trial court determines the arbitration decision may have an effect on the litigation.”). The appellants have not filed a motion in the trial court seeking to compel arbitration and the trial court did not construe the appellants’ motion to dismiss as such a motion.

DISMISSED.

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Federico Gomez v. S & I Props., LLC, 220 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)
    …that he was not entitled to arbitrate the fraud claim. Three times, in Southeastern Title and Insurance Co. v. Curtis, 155 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963), Weber v. Bonilla-Mathe, 807 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), and Hopewell, LLC v. Alarion Bank, 84 So. 3d 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), this court and another district court have addressed this argument (an order denying a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause is the same for appellate jurisdiction purposes as an order determining entitlement to arbit…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw