M.G., THE MOTHER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2012-04-25
No. 3D12-48
Before SHEPHERD, ROTHENBERG, and EMAS, JJ.
86 So. 3d 1149 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2012) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's order placing a dependent child in permanent guardianship because the written order failed to comply with statutory requirements under section 39.6221(2). Specifically, the order lacked sufficient findings regarding why reunification was impossible and failed to specify the frequency and nature of parental visitation.


Holding

The court held that the trial court's order violated section 39.6221(2)(a) by failing to provide specific findings of fact regarding why the mother was unfit or why reunification was impossible, and violated section 39.6221(2)(c) by leaving visitation frequency to the custodians' discretion instead of establishing a specific schedule. The mother did not waive her visitation rights, as there was no evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court order establishing permanent guardianship must specify the reasons why parents are unfit and reunification is not possible, either by referencing prior depe…

[2] A trial court order establishing permanent guardianship must specify the frequency and nature of visitation between the child and parents.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“When a trial court places a minor child in a permanent guardianship in lieu of reunification or adoption, section 39.6221(2) of the Florida Statutes requires the trial court's written order to: (a) List the circumstances or reasons why the child's parents are not fit to care for the child and why reunification is not possible by referring to specific findings of fact made in its order adjudicating the child dependent or by making separate findings of fact; [and] (c) Specify the frequency and nature of visitation or contact between the child and his or her parents.”

Establishes the mandatory statutory requirements for permanency orders that the trial court failed to meet.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The trial court terminated the Department of Children and Families' protective supervision over R.G. and placed the child in permanent guardianship wi…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SHEPHERD, J.

SHEPHERD, J.

This is an appeal by M.G., a mother, of a trial court order terminating the Department of Children and Families’ (the Department) protective supervision over her minor child, R.G., and placing the child in permanent guardianship of the minor child’s older half-sister and her half-sister’s boyfriend. Although the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling, we agree with the mother the written order is insufficient to meet the requirements of section 39.6221(2), Florida Statutes (2011), in two respects.

When a trial court places a minor child in a permanent guardianship in lieu of reunification or adoption, section 39.6221(2) of the Florida Statutes requires the trial court’s written order to:

(a) List the circumstances or reasons why the child’s parents are not fit to care for the child and why reunification is not possible by referring to specific findings of fact made in its order adjudicating the child dependent or by making separate findings of fact; [and]
*1150(c) Specify the frequency and nature of visitation or contact between the child and his or her parents....

§ 39.6221(2), Fla. Stat.

The guardianship order in our case is a form order, with which the trial court filled in the blanks. Regarding the reasons why the mother is not fit to care for the child or why reunification is not possible, pursuant to section 89.6221(2)(a), the form states:

Reunification with the parent(s) at this time would be contrary to the welfare and not in the best interest of the child(ren). The parents are not fit to care for the child(ren) and reunification is not possible because of the circumstances from which the court previously based its finding that the children are dependent in the order of adjudication, and in addition (input the specific reasons):

No reasons are stated.

Regarding the frequency and nature of visitation between the mother and the minor child, the order on appeal states:

Supervised visitation with the child(ren). The visitation shall be supervised at all times by the permanent guardian or an adult approved by the Department. The visitation shall occur on a schedule agreed by the parties and at a place agreed by the parties. The frequency of the visitation shall be:

The trial court added “at the custodians’ sole discretion.”

The Department concedes the trial court’s order does not meet the statutory requirements of section 39.6221(2)(a). See R.T., Sr. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 27 So.3d 195, 196-97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (finding similar language in the trial court’s order legally insufficient “because the order does not refer to specific findings of fact set forth in the trial court’s dependency order nor contain separate findings of fact regarding the issue of reunification”); see also In re J.S., 18 So.3d 712, 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). However, the Department contends the mother waived her right as to section 39.6221(2)(c) because of a desire to be alleviated from any responsibilities relating to the minor child. The trial court made no such findings and there is no record evidence to support a knowing and voluntary waiver of visitation by the mother. Accordingly, the trial court’s order placing the frequency of visitation at the custodians’ sole discretion was error. See In re J.L.R., Jr., 64 So.3d 1283, 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (finding the plain language of section 39.6221(2)(c) mandates a trial court to establish a specific visitation schedule rather than leaving visitation to the discretion of either of the parties).

Reversed and remanded for entry of an order in compliance with the requirements of section 39.6221(2), Florida Statutes.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • T.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 189 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …sed its finding that the children are dependent have not been ameliorated.” Similar language has been rejected as inadequate under the statute. See, e.g., In re R.C., 118 So. 3d 924, 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); M.G. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 86 So. 3d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). The written order does not comply with the statutory requirements of section 39.6221(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2014). Moreover, the reasons set forth in the order of dependency do not appear to be the same reasons upon which…
  • …t satisfy the statute. See J.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 18 So. 3d 712, 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing C.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 988 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)); see also M.G. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 86 So. 3d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); R.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 27 So. 3d 195, 196 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Further, the reference to D.C.’s failure to complete a case plan would not be sufficient, by itself, to support a permanent guardianship placemen…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw