FREDERICK W. WARD, APPELLANT,
v.
NAHIR I. DONES, APPELLEE
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Ward appealed a trial court's decision to vacate a General Magistrate's finding of contempt against his ex-wife Dones for allegedly making negative comments about him to their child in violation of a parental planning schedule. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly reweighed evidence rather than applying the correct standard of review, which requires the trial court to accept the magistrate's factual findings if supported by competent substantial evidence.
The trial court erroneously vacated the General Magistrate's determination because it exceeded the scope of permissible review. The trial court must accept the General Magistrate's factual findings if supported by competent substantial evidence and cannot reweigh evidence or override the magistrate's credibility determinations regarding live testimony.
[1] A trial court errs by substituting its judgment for that of a general magistrate when the magistrate's factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence.
[2] A trial court may not reweigh evidence presented to a general magistrate to make different factual findings, but must instead determine if the magistrate's findings are s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a trial court appoints a magistrate to take testimony and make findings, it loses the prerogative of substituting its judgment for that of the magistrate.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that trial courts cannot override magistrate findings unless unsupported by competent substantial evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWard and Dones were divorced and subject to a parental planning schedule prohibiting negative comments by one parent about the other. In December 2009…
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Frederick Ward, former husband of Nahir I. Dones, appeals the trial court’s acceptance of Dones’ exceptions to the General Magistrate’s report. We reverse because the trial court erroneously vacated the General Magistrate’s determination even though it was based upon competent substantial evidence.
Ward alleges Dones violated a parental planning schedule included in the final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The planning schedule provides the child shall be “free of negative comments and behavior by one parent about the other.” In December .2009, Ward sought contempt against Dones because she allegedly “implant[ed] negative information in the child in an obvious effort to alienate the child from the father.” Ward alleged the child repeated negative statements made about him, which could only have come from Dones. The General Magistrate held an evidentiary hearing, at which Ward, Dones, and the school nurse from the child’s school testified. A recording alleged to be probative of Ward’s version of facts was also played at the hearing.
The General Magistrate found it was impossible for the child to have independently obtained the negative information the child allegedly recounted, and from this premise, the General Magistrate reasoned Ward’s motion should be granted. The General Magistrate’s report and recommendation summarized relevant portions of the record in support of its conclusions.
Dones filed exceptions to the General Magistrate’s report and recommendation, challenging its bases. The trial court reviewed the evidence and determined that, when reviewed as a whole, the evidence could not support the General Magistrate’s conclusion. As a result, the trial court granted Dones’ exceptions and determined a finding of contempt was not warranted. Ward appeals.
“Once a trial court appoints a magistrate to take testimony and make findings, it loses the prerogative of substi*828tuting its judgment for that of the magistrate.” Cerase v. Dewhurst, 935 So.2d 575, 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). As a result, “the trial court is bound by the general [magistrate's factual findings unless they are not supported by competent substantial evidence.” Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So.2d 360, 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); see also Bragassa v. Bragassa, 505 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Dent v. Dent, 438 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
The trial court’s decision to grant the exceptions to the General Magistrate’s report and recommendation was error because the trial court exceeded the scope of permissible review. The trial judge reweighed evidence to make different findings based upon the same evidence, rather than determining whether the findings were supported by competent substantial evidence. The trial court could not override the General Magistrate’s credibility determinations regarding the live evidence presented to the General Magistrate. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s order which vacated the General Magistrate’s determination.
Reversed.
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Vargas v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 104 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…therefore, entitled to no relief below and is entitled to no relief here. Second, the order must be affirmed because, as the general magistrate aptly found, there is no evidence that the parties ever reached a binding agreement. See Ward v. Dones, 90 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[T]he trial court is bound by the general [magistrate's factual findings unless they are not supported by competent substantial evidence.” (quoting Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006))). Deutsche Bank’s…
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Eddy Rodriguez v. Reyes, 112 So. 3d 671 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…, “[o]nce a trial court appoints a magistrate to take testimony and make findings, it loses the prerogative of substituting its judgment for that of the magistrate.” Cerase v. Dewhurst, 935 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); see also Ward v. Dones, 90 So. 3d 826, 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), reh’g denied, (May 30, 2012). In such instances, a trial court reviewing a magistrate’s findings and recommendations takes on a role similar to that of an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s actions. Cerase, 935 So. 2d…
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Moises Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)…to the magistrate’s report are significant. A trial court, such as in this case, is “bound by the general [magistrate’s] factual findings [contained in the report] unless they are not supported by competent substantial evidence.” Ward v. Dones, 90 So. 3d 826, 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (quoting Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). The result of Former Husband’s decision not to file exceptions to the magistrate’s report was that no transcript of the evidentiary hearing held bef…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bragassa v. Bragassa, 505 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Dent v. Dent, 438 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Robinson v. Robinson, 928 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
- Dondrae Williams v. State, 935 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Williams v. State, 935 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)