STATE EX REL. PAUL RIMMEIR, RELATOR,
v.
STANLEY MILLEDGE, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE, AND JACK DICKSON AND BENJAMIN HORROW, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit judge from applying an incorrect damages rule in a trade name infringement case, despite the court's prior three decisions establishing the correct legal standard. The Court reaffirmed that plaintiffs must make a definite showing of specific damages rather than the rule the judge intended to apply.
The circuit judge is ordered and directed to reject the previously-rejected damages rule and instead award only such damages as are specifically proved by the plaintiffs under the correct legal standard established in the Court's prior opinions.
“the burden was upon the plaintiffs "to make a 'definite showing of specific damages', if they can, resulting from the infringement of plaintiffs' trade name by defendants."”
Establishes the correct legal standard for damages that the judge must apply, requiring specific proof rather than the rejected rule
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis case involves a trade name infringement dispute between Rimmeir (defendant/relator) and Dickson and Horrow (plaintiffs/respondents). The case had…
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By a suggestion for the writ of prohibition the relator seeks a rule of this court prohibiting the respondents from proceeding contrary to prior mandates of this court entered in a controversy wherein the respondents Dickson and Horrow are plaintiffs and the relator is the defendant, which cause is now pending again before the respondent circuit judge for a determination of the question of damages, if any, *356to which the respondents are entitled. The suggestion for the writ will he treated and considered as a petition to this court to exercise its inherent power to issue any-writ necessary or proper to the complete exercise of our jurisdiction. See § 4, Article V, of the Florida Constitution, F. S.A. Upon notice given the parties appeared by and through counsel and oral argument was heard by the court.
The previous opinions of this court upon which our mandates were based are as follows: Rimmeir v. Dickson, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 732; Dickson v. Rimmeir, Fla. 1957, 93 So.2d 82; and Rimmeir v. Dickson, Fla.1957, 98 So.2d 787. By these decisions it was established as the law of this case that the rule of damages contended for by the respondents Dickson and Horrow, which was incorporated in the decree first entered by the respondent judge in the instant case, is not applicable here. Under the principle of stare decisis and the opinion of this court in Florida Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson, Fla.1953, 67 So.2d 215, we specifically rejected this rule as applied to the facts of the instant case and held that the burden was upon the plaintiffs “to make a ‘definite showing of specific damages’, if they can, resulting from the infringement of plaintiffs’ trade name by defendants.” Rimmeir v. Dickson, supra, 78 So.2d 732, 735.
Despite our pronouncement, the record shows that the respondent judge has adhered to his former view that the rule of damages contended for by the respondents Dickson and Horrow is applicable and that he will proceed to determine the question of damages in accordance therewith unless inhibited by this court. Any attempt by the respondent judge to do so would be a clear violation of the mandate of this court and a trespass on its jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the respondent judge is ordered and directed to eschew the rule of damages and the procedure thereunder held inapplicable by this court in its former opinion and, in accordance with our previous decision, to award to the respondents Dickson and Horrow only such damages as are specifically proved by them and to which they are entitled under applicable principles of law, as heretofore announced in this cause.
It is so ordered.
TERRELL, C. J., and THOMAS, HOB-SON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., dissents.
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Frank A. Stuart, M.D. v. The HERTZ Corp., 381 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…ile an amended third party complaint prior to the consent judgment between the initial plaintiffs and the respondents. This Court may issue any writ necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rimmeir v. Milledge, 104 So. 2d 355 (Fla.1958); Wright v. Board of Public Instruction for County of Sumter, 100 So. 2d 403 (Fla.1958); Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(3); Article V, Section 4(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We have the inherent power to enforce our mandates and to give such judgme…
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Inphynet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. David M. Soria, M.D., 82 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…pon issuance of the appellate mandate, to allow the filing of an amended third party complaint). Prohibition will therefore lie to prevent a trial court from proceeding contrary to an appellate court’s mandate. See State ex rel. Rimmeir v. Milledge, 104 So. 2d 355 (Fla.1958). Prohibition is appropriate in situations “where a lower court, following an appeal, entertains proceedings inconsistent with the appellate court’s mandate.” State ex rel. Paluska v. White, 162 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (denying…
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Rimmeir v. Dickson, 107 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1958)…PER CURIAM. We here review a decree of the lower court determining and awarding damages to the plaintiffs-appellees in accordance with the mandate of this court in State ex rel. Rimmeir v. Milledge, Fla.1958, 104 So. 2d 355, which required the plaintiffs to make a definite showing of specific damages incurred by them as a result of unfair competitive practices of defendant-appellant heretofore enjoined by this court. The Chancellor’s decree awarded damages for (1) los…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Ventilated Awning Co., Inc. v. Dickson, 67 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1953)
- Rimmeir v. Dickson, 78 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1955)
- Dickson v. Rimmeir, 93 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1956)
- Rimmeir v. Dickson, 98 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1957)