ANTHONY HOLLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed Anthony Holley's burglary conviction, holding that the trial court committed per se reversible error by denying his unequivocal request to represent himself without conducting a Faretta inquiry, despite previously finding he was malingering mental health symptoms.
The trial court must conduct a Faretta inquiry when a defendant makes an unequivocal request to self-represent. The Edwards exception permitting denial of self-representation based on severe mental illness does not apply when there is no record evidence supporting a finding of severe mental illness; the trial court's failure to conduct this inquiry constitutes per se reversible error.
[1] A trial court commits per se reversible error by denying a defendant's unequivocal request to represent himself without conducting a Faretta inquiry, even if the court pr…
[2] A trial court shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent himself if the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and does not suf…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court committed per se reversible error when the court, relying on concerns over appellant's mental health, denied appellant's unequivocal requests to represent himself without conducting any Faretta inquiry”
Establishes that failure to conduct Faretta hearing on unequivocal pro se request is per se reversible error
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnthony Holley was charged with burglary of a conveyance and battery against his wife. At a competency hearing, the trial court determined that Holley…
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We reverse appellant’s conviction for burglary of a conveyance.1 The trial court committed per se reversible error when the court, relying on concerns over appellant’s mental health, denied appellant’s unequivocal requests to represent himself without conducting any Faretta 2 inquiry, even though the court previously determined at a competency hearing that appellant was malingering his symptoms of mental health issues and the record evidence does not support the conclusion that appellant suffered from a severe mental illness.
To be sure, the United States Constitution permits judges to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial, but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3) (2009) (the trial court shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself “if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and does not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself or herself’). However, in this case, there was no record evidence that appellant suffered from severe mental illness, as the mental health experts who evaluated appellant opined that he was malingering and that there was no reason to believe he was mentally ill. Because the record evidence does not support the conclusion that appellant suffered from a severe mental illness, the Edwards exception to the constitutional right of self-representation does not apply-
*218In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to hold a Faretta inquiry when appellant unequivocally requested to represent himself after the competency hearing.3 See McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 864 (Fla.2011) (although a trial court’s decision on a defendant’s request for self-representation is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s failure to take the preliminary step of holding a hearing on a defendant’s unequivocal pro se request results in per se reversible error). Consequently, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and Remanded.
STEVENSON, TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (U.S. 2008)
- Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2006)
- McCRAY v. State, 71 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2011)