MARK J. MAHER, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNE C. MAHER, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Mark Maher's petition to modify downward his child support obligation. The court held that Maher failed to meet the heightened burden required when seeking to reduce child support that was set by marital settlement agreement, as his claimed income reduction was neither involuntary nor permanent.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested downward modification because Maher failed to meet the heightened burden applicable when seeking to reduce agreed child support. His claimed income reduction was neither involuntary nor permanent in nature, as he appeared to be voluntarily reducing his income by failing to seek employment commensurate with his skills and abilities.
[1] A party seeking modification of child support must prove a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the final judgment and is sufficie…
[2] A party seeking a downward modification of child support established by a marital settlement agreement faces a heavier burden of proof.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“First, there must be a substantial change in circumstances. Second, the change was not contemplated at the time of final judgment of dissolution. Third, the change is 'sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in nature.'”
Establishes the three fundamental prerequisites required to obtain child support modification, which form the legal standard the court applies
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMark Maher sought modification of child support that had been established in a marital settlement agreement at the time of divorce. At the time of the…
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We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for modification of child support. The party moving for a modification of child support has the burden of proving all of the following factors, or rather, “three fundamental prerequisites,” Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So.2d 905, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005): “First, there must be a substantial change in circumstances. Second, the change was not contemplated at the time of final judgment of dissolution. Third, the change is ‘sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in nature.’” (quoting Pimm v. Pimm 601 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla.1992)). When the original child support amount is based on an agreement by the parties, as here, there is a heavier burden on the party seeking a downward modification. Hand v. Kushmer, 673 So.2d 926, 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing *1023 Fritz v. Fritz, 485 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So.2d 1250 (Fla.1992)).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a greater modification than it allowed. The child support was set in a marital settlement agreement executed at the time the parties divorced. The record supports a conclusion that the reduction in income for appellant, a self-employed entrepreneur at the time of the modification, was neither involuntary nor permanent in nature. He had been employed by a corporation earning a decent salary at the time of the divorce. No evidence was presented as to how or why he lost that income. Appellant had invested in real estate, some of which was in foreclosure. He was trying to sell solar products on commission through his solely-owned company, but he had earned nothing from this enterprise. When asked by appellee when he planned to look for other employment, appellant’s response was simply, “I am looking at all my options.” In other words, the court could conclude that appellant was voluntarily reducing his income by failing to use any effort to find work commensurate with his skills and abilities. Moreover, although he claims to have little income, he has continued to maintain a lifestyle where his expenses total in excess of $4,000 per month. The court simply did not believe that his income as a self-employed “entrepreneur” was reduced to the level that he claimed. Thus, he did not meet the heavier burden of showing that a downward modification of the agreed child support was warranted.
Affirmed.
DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Kozell v. Kozell, 142 So. 3d 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…the following factors: (1) a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the change was not contemplated at the time of the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) the change is sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in nature. Maher v. Maher, 96 So. 3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “When the original child support amount is based on an agreement by the parties, as here, there is a heavier burden on the party seeking a downward modification.” Id. The husband argues that competent substantial evidence…
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Wood v. Wood, 162 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…the following factors: (1) a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the change was not contemplated at the time of the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) the change is sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in nature. Maher v. Maher, 96 So. 3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “When the original child support amount is based on an agreement by the parties, as here, there is a heavier burden on the party seeking a downward modification.” Id. Generally, “the standard of review governing a trial c…
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Colette O. deLABRY v. David J. Sales, 134 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…in the majority, a party moving for modification has the burden to prove a substantial change in circumstance, not contemplated at the time of the final judgment of dissolution, which is sufficient, material, and permanent in nature. Maher v. Maher, 96 So. 3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA [*1118] 2012). Where the original amount is based upon an agreement between the parties, the burden is heavier. Id. “[A] substantial decrease in a parent’s earnings does not in all circumstances require a reduction in support pa…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992)
- Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992)
- Hicks v. State, 485 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Aleyda Fritz v. Fritz, 485 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Hand v. Kushmer, 673 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)