EUGENE SWANSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eugene Swanson appeals the denial of his motion to correct consecutive sentences imposed for sexual battery and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon conviction, arguing the consecutive habitual felony offender sentences violate Hale v. State principles for offenses arising from a single criminal episode. The court reverses and remands, holding that consecutive sentences are illegal and must be redesignated to run concurrently.
The court held that Swanson's consecutive sentences are illegal under Hale v. State because both offenses arose from a single criminal episode. The court reversed the postconviction court's order and remanded for the sentences to be redesignated to run concurrently rather than consecutively.
[1] A defendant is not required to cite exact page numbers when identifying record documents relied upon in a motion to correct sentence, but must identify them with particul…
[2] Consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode violate the principles announced in Hale v. …
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant is not required to cite exact page numbers; he or she must only "identify with particularity the nonhearsay record documents upon which he [or she] relies."”
Establishes the procedural standard for identifying record documents in Rule 3.800(a) motions, rejecting the State's demand for exact page citations.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 15, 1980, Swanson was convicted of sexual battery with a deadly weapon (count one) and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (count two)…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Eugene Swanson appeals the summary denial of his amended motion to correct sentence filed in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On February 15, 1980, Swanson was found guilty of sexual battery with a deadly weapon (count one) and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (count two). The trial court sentenced Swanson to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment1 on count one and thirty years’ imprisonment as a habit*195ual felony offender on count two. The sentences were designated to run consecutively. In his motion, Swanson alleged that his sentences should run concurrently because consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode violate the principles announced in Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993). For the reasons stated below, we reverse the postconviction court’s order.
We ordered the State to show cause why Swanson should not be granted relief. In its response, the State conceded that an excerpt from the victim’s trial testimony would be facially sufficient to establish a prima facie claim that both of Swanson’s offenses took place during a single criminal episode. Nevertheless, the State argued that Swanson’s claim was still procedurally insufficient because he failed to identify the specific transcript page numbers where the testimony in question could be found. However, such a standard places an undue burden on defendants. A defendant is not required to cite exact page numbers; he or she must only “identify with particularity the nonhearsay record documents upon which he [or she] relies.” Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA2004).
In the alternative argument in its response, the State conceded that Swanson’s consecutive sentences are illegal under the principles announced in Hale. However, the State’s suggested remedy for the illegality is different from the approach we employ here. If Swanson’s conviction for aggravated battery is not subject to a habitual felony offender enhancement, the maximum sentence for that offense is fifteen years, not thirty. The State contends that running the ninety-nine-year sentence for sexual battery concurrently with the reduced fifteen-year sentence for aggravated battery would defeat the trial court’s intent to impose the longest period of time for the two offenses. The State suggests restructuring the sentences by eliminating the habitual felony offender term completely and running the maximum fifteen-year term for aggravated battery consecutively with the ninety-nine-year term imposed for sexual battery. The resulting sentence would total 114 years, fifteen years less than Swanson’s current 129-year sentence. We reject this approach as being inconsistent with Hale.
Accordingly, we accept the State’s concession that Swanson’s consecutive sentences are illegal under Hale, hold that Swanson’s consecutive sentences are illegal, and reverse the postconviction court’s order. On remand, the postconviction court shall correct Swanson’s sentences by redesignating them to run concurrently.
Reversed and remanded.
VILLANTI, WALLACE, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
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Eliseo Gonzales Saldana v. State, 139 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…gal under Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993). Under Hale, consecutive HFO and non-HFO sentences are illegal if the underlying offenses arose from the same episode. Williams v. State, 124 So. 3d 286, 288-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Swanson v. State, 98 So. 3d 194, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). But see Cotto v. State, 89 So. 3d 1025, 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[W]e read Hale to forbid only the imposition of two or more consecutive sentences that have themselves been enhanced and which arise from the same criminal ep…
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Williams v. State, 124 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…un concurrently.”); see also Hamilton v. State, 996 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Kiedrowski v. State, 876 So. 2d 692, 694-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). However, after the postconviction court entered its order, this court issued Swanson v. State, 98 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), in which we held that a combination of habitualized and nonhabitualized sentences running consecutively is illegal under Hale when the offenses arose from a single episode. At least two other district courts of appeal have also e…
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Downs v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…crimes were committed in a single episode). Although, "[a] defendant is not required to cite exact page numbers; he or she must . . . 'identify with particularity the nonhearsay record documents upon which he [or she] relies.' " Swanson v. State, 98 So. 3d 194, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Speas, 887 So. 2d at 418)). Moreover, the exhibits are not competent evidence. The Florida Supreme Court has held that a postconviction court may not rely upon hearsay, such as a poli…
Authorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- Speas v. State, 887 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)