ANN MARIE SABATINI, FORMER WIFE, APPELLANT,

v.

VINCENT COI WIGH, FORMER HUSBAND, APPELLEE

WETHERELL, J.

Appellant, the former wife, seeks review of a civil contempt order resulting from her failure to comply with the shared pa*245rental responsibility requirements in the consent final judgment dissolving her marriage to Appellee, the former husband. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding her in contempt and imposing a “sanction” that required her to re-enroll the parties’ child in a Jacksonville school if instructed to do so by the former husband. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing this sanction,1 but we affirm the finding of contempt.

The parties’ marriage was dissolved in 2008. Appellant was awarded primary residential custody of the parties’ child. The final judgment of dissolution directed the parties to share parental responsibility and jointly determine major decisions affecting the welfare of the child, such as her education. The judgment required the parties to work cooperatively to resolve any disputes, and if they were unable to do so on their own, they were required to consult with a reasonably qualified third party in an effort to resolve the dispute.

In September 2011, the former husband filed a motion for contempt, alleging among other things that Appellant enrolled the child in a school in Palm Coast without consulting with him. At the evi-dentiary hearing on the motion, the former husband testified that the parties agreed to enroll the child in a Jacksonville school near the former husband’s home; that he enrolled the child in the agreed-upon school and notified Appellant of the enrollment; that two days prior to the start of the school year, Appellant informed him that she had enrolled the child in a Palm Coast school approximately 70 miles from the former husband’s home; and that this adversely affected his time with the child because it was more difficult for him to attend school events and his after-school visitations started later because of the drive time between Palm Coast and Jacksonville.

The former husband did not seek an order directing Appellant to re-enroll the child in the Jacksonville school agreed upon by the parties because he recognized such a change may not be in the child’s best interests in the middle of the school year.2 Instead, he sought an order finding Appellant in contempt and requiring her to pay attorney’s fees, which he argued was “necessary in order to hopefully have some effect on her future decision making.”3

The trial court found that Appellant failed to comply with the shared parental responsibility requirements of the dissolution judgment by unilaterally enrolling the child in the Palm Coast school in contra*246vention of the parties’ agreement that the child would be enrolled in the Jacksonville school near the former husband’s home. The court further found that Appellant’s actions were “willful acts intended to interfere with [the former husband’s] parental responsibilities and his time with the minor child.” As a “sanction” for Appellant’s actions, the trial court gave the former husband the option to decide whether to re-enroll the child in the Jacksonville school, and to that end, the Order of Contempt entered by the trial court stated that “upon the Former Husband’s instructions, [Appellant] shall be required to re-enroll the child in [the Jacksonville school].”4 Appellant timely appealed the order to this court.

Where, as here, the judgment of contempt is based on noncompliance with a clear directive in a prior court order, the judgment “comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless a clear showing is made that the trial court either abused its discretion or departed so substantially from the essential requirements of law as to have committed fundamental error.” Harris v. Hampton, 70 So.Bd 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting DeMello v. Buckman, 914 So.2d 1090, 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)); see also Jaffe v. Jaffe, 17 So.Bd 1251,1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (“We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to exercise its power to find a party in civil contempt.”); Thurman v. Thurman, 637 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reviewing a civil contempt order resulting from the former husband’s failure to pay child support for an abuse of discretion).

Here, the trial court’s finding that Appellant willfully failed to comply with the requirement in the dissolution judgment that she jointly decide issues related to the child’s education with the former husband is supported by competent substantial evidence, as is the finding that the child’s enrollment in the Palm Coast school adversely impacts the former husband’s time and relationship with the child. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant in contempt. The trial court did, however, abuse its discretion in imposing a “sanction” for Appellant’s contempt that directly impacted the parties’ child without making any findings as to whether the change in schools ordered by the court was in the child’s best interests.5

The paramount concern in family law cases involving a child is the best interests of the child. See generally § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (requiring the court to determine all matters relating to parenting of the child in accordance with the best interests of the child), § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (stating that the best interests of the child is the “primary consideration” when establishing or modifying a parent*247ing plan). Thus, when crafting an order to sanction a parent’s contumacious conduct in such cases, the trial court must be mindful of how the sanction will impact the child. See Cheek v. Hesik, 73 So.3d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reversing an order imposing makeup time-sharing because the trial court failed to make findings regarding the best interests of the child); Berger v. Berger, 795 So.2d 113, 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is to obtain compliance with the court’s initial order. The sanction of changing custody or visitation does not coerce compliance. In fact, it may penalize the children for their parents’ contumacious conduct, a result opposite from their best interests.”). Likewise, when making decisions that impact a child’s education, the trial court must consider the best interests of the child. See Otto-Jones v. Jones, 69 So.3d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing an order requiring the parties’ child to spend half the school year in private school and half in public school because such a rotating schedule was not in the best interests of the child); Norris v. Norris, 926 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (reversing an order regarding the placement of the parties’ children in school because the record did not support the contention that the public school was in the children’s best interests).

Here, the trial court did not find that requiring the parties’ child to be moved to the Jacksonville school in the middle of the school year was in the best interests of the child. Indeed, the only evidence on this issue was the former husband’s testimony that a change in schools in the middle of a school year may not be “the best thing” for the child. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sanction on Appellant that would require her to re-enroll the child in the Jacksonville school at the direction of the former husband.

In sum, we affirm the finding of contempt because it is supported by competent substantial evidence, but we reverse the sanction ordered by the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED for further proceedings.

ROBERTS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.