W. T. RAWLEIGH CO.
v.
C. A. LANGFORD, ET AL.
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a jury trial verdict because the trial judge gave an instruction on waiver, release, or estoppel without any basis in the pleadings. The case involved a contract action where the court found the jury charge suggested defenses that were not properly pleaded by the defendants.
The court held that the jury charge was harmful error because it had no basis in the pleadings. Defenses based on waiver, release, or estoppel must be specially pleaded to be available and cannot be introduced through jury instructions alone.
“This Court finds no basis in the pleadings for the giving of a charge of the character here complained of; therefore, the giving of such charge was harmful error for which a new trial must be awarded.”
Establishes the core holding that jury instructions on defenses must be grounded in the pleadings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceW. T. Rawleigh Co. brought an action at law against C. A. Langford and two sureties (Leonard and Cox) on an express contract. The defendants pleaded t…
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In the trial of an action at law the judge gave the following charge to the jury, which was excepted to by plaintiff in error, the plaintiff below, by incorporating same as ground of a motion for a new trial:
“ ‘But, if after entering into the contract you find from the evidence that the plaintiffs in this' case, by caprice or inducement, inveigled Langford to adopt a system which the contract didn’t call for, and he did adopt at their request, and he sold goods on credit, he would be entitled to the *488benefit of that credit if he carried out the instructions they gave him. Neither would Leonard and Cox be bound to any greater amount after giving them credit for the amount that Langford might have sold under these instructions. In other words, the plaintiff is' required to deal fairly with these parties after they got their contract, and not put on a scheme of cunningness and chicanery to inveigle them to do something that the contract in fine English language said they could not do.’ ”
The action was on an express contract, the defendants being the principal and two- sureties on that contract. The only issues were pleas of - (1) never was indebted as alleged; (2) never promised as alleged; (3) set off.
. This Court finds no basis in the pleadings' for the giving of a charge of the character here complained of; therefore, the giving of such charge was harmful error for which a new trial must be awarded.
Attention is called to the fact .that the pleadings of defendants should be recast in advance of another trial, if the nucleus of any such defense as is implied in the charge of the court, above held bad, is to be relied on. The charge suggests the idea of waiver, release or estoppel as applied to the provisions of the written contract sued on, a defense that must be specially pleaded to be availed of.
Reversed for a new trial.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
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Sottile v. Gaines Constr. Co., 281 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…m or debt arising after its execution ? A release executed by a party attempting to assert a claim allegedly barred by said release is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded in the answer. RCP 1.110(d) 30 F.S.A.; W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Langford, 112 Fla. 487, 150 So. 592. Of course, an available affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer is deemed to be waived. Fink v. Powsner, Fla.App.1958, 108 So. 2d 324. Moreover, the entry of a decree pro confesso or default judgment [*561] generally precludes a…
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Enstrom v. Dunning, 124 Fla. 571 (Fla. 1936)…as not raised in the court below. Nor was it pleaded. The general rule is that estoppel, to be availed of on the trial or hearing must be specially pleaded. 10 R. C. L. 842; Lakeland v. Turner, 207 Ala. 73, 91 So. 877; W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Langford, 112 Fla. 487, 150 So. 592. Nor was this question embraced in the statement of questions involved, as made by appellant or as corrected by appellee. And surely partial payments made on a usurious contract, either before or after maturity cannot estop the borrower…
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Sunrise Lakes Condo. Apts. v. Hechtman, 446 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…of estoppel and waiver. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that the appellant was estopped from requiring the removal of the washing machine and dryer. Estoppel must be specifically pled or it is considered waived. W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Langford, 112 Fla. 487, 150 So. 592 (1933); Department of Revenue v. Hobbs, 368 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). [*273] Appellant further maintains that it was error for the trial court to deny its motion for summary final judgment. The trial court found that because both…
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