D. ROBERT LEWIS, APPELLANT,
v.
LOIS H. LEWIS, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1958-07-30
No. 57-453
CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.
104 So. 2d 597 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1958) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

In this divorce appeal, the Third District Court of Florida affirmed a trial court's award of alimony, child support, and attorney's fees to the wife, rejecting the husband's claim that the awards were excessive and an abuse of discretion. The court held that absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, awards of alimony and support rest within the trial judge's sound discretion.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's awards, holding that absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the complaining party, awards of alimony, support, and attorney's fees remain within the trial judge's sound judicial discretion. The trial court properly considered the appellant's prior earning capacity, his disability, and his present earning capacity.


Key Quotes

“an award of alimony and support as well as attorney's fees is within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge”

Establishes the fundamental principle that alimony and attorney's fee awards rest within judicial discretion

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Facts & Procedural History

D. Robert Lewis, age 27, earned approximately $20,000 annually over the six years preceding the divorce action. Prior to the divorce, he had been prov…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is from that portion of a final decree in a divorce action awarding alimony and support for the wife and three minor children and attorney’s fees for the wife’s counsel.

The final decree awarded $100 per week to the wife as alimony and support for herself and three minor children, and in addition required the appellant to make mortgage payments on the marital home, as well as to pay taxes and insurance premiums. The decree further provided that in the event the marital home is sold, then the appellant would be required to pay the sum of $1,300 per year, in equal monthly installments as a rental allowance for the wife and children. The decree contained an award of $1,500 attorney’s fees for the wife’s counsel which was in addition to a prior temporary award of $300.

The appellant urges that the awards of alimony and support and attorney’s fees are excessive and evince an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.

It would belabor the point to cite the many authorities and particularly those of our Supreme Court to the effect that an award of alimony and support as well as attorney’s fees is within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge. Where an award or awards have been attacked as excessive or as an abuse of discretion, the burden of clearly showing such abuse of discretion is upon the one who complains.

In this instance, the appellant is a young man, 27 years of age, whose income for the six years preceding this divorce action averaged approximately $20,000. Prior to the institution of this action, the appellant had been giving his wife a $450 per month allowance, and in addition had paid other sums for clothing, mortgage payments, taxes and insurance. The appellant urges that the awards should have been predicated upon his salary income for the year 1956, which was $8,600, *598and that this amount is a true reflection of what his prospective income will be due to disability resulting from an unfortunate injury. The trial judge, however, appears to have fully considered the prior earning capacity of the appellant, his unfortunate disability and his present earning capacity. Under these circumstances, we cannot say with any degree of certainty that a clear showing of abuse of discretion has been made. It may be that the present award of alimony and support, together with the further prospective award if the home is sold, may work a hardship or burden upon the appellant, but in such event, he has appropriate recourse for reduction under § 65.15, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Accordingly, the decree appealed from is affirmed.

CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Deigaard v. Deigaard, 114 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
    …sufficient to sustain the awards. Under the circumstances of the parties, as developed by the testimony and exhibits,' the chancellor did not, in our opinion, abuse his discretion in making'the awards which he did. See Lewis v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 597; Gilbert v. Gilbert, Fla.App.1958, 105 So. 2d 379. The second contention of the appellant we think has merit. The chancellor by his decree awarded the wife the sum of $75 per week alimony which, as we have heretofore held, was justified in view of…
  • Gilbert v. Gilbert, 105 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
    …rneys’ fees, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and where such an award or awards have been attacked as an abuse of discretion, the burden of clearly showing such abuse is upon the one who complains. See Lewis v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 597. We are reluctant in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to set aside his order and substitute our judgment for his. We cannot say in this instance with any degree of certainty that a clear showing of abuse of…
  • Katz v. Ira G. Katz, 159 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
    …t as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees and there was substantial, competent evidence before the chancellor to support the award which he rendered, and same will not be destroyed in the face of such evidence. See: Lewis v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 597; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 137. The chancellor had the power to award lump sum alimony in his discretion. See: Rubinow v. Rubinow, Fla.1949, 40 So. 2d 561; Cocalis v. Cocalis, Fla.App.1958, 103 So. 2d 230; § 65.08, Fla.Stat., F.…

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