GERALD ARMSTRONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a habitual felony offender sentence because the trial court improperly relied on hearsay testimony regarding the defendant's probation release date to establish the statutory predicate for enhanced sentencing.
A trial court errs in relying on hearsay testimony from a DOC employee regarding a defendant's probation release date to establish that the defendant qualifies as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes.
[1] Testimony from a Department of Corrections employee regarding a defendant's probation release date, obtained from the DOC website, constitutes inadmissible hearsay and ca…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it was error for the court to rely on this testimony to find that the appellant qualified as an HFO”
Court's explanation of why the trial court's reliance on the DOC employee's hearsay testimony was erroneous
Armstrong was sentenced as a habitual felony offender based on testimony from a Department of Corrections employee who stated the date Armstrong was r…
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The appellant challenges his habitual felony offender (HFO) sentence, and argues that the court erred in relying on hearsay to find that he qualified for enhanced sentencing under section 775.084, Florida Statutes. We accept the State’s concession of error and reverse.
At the sentencing hearing, a Department of Corrections (DOC) employee testified to the date the appellant was released from probation, a date he obtained from the DOC website. This date was within five years of the instant offense date. As the state concedes, it was error for the court to rely on this testimony to find that the appellant qualified as an HFO. See King v. State, 590 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that probation officer’s testimony as to appellant’s release date was hearsay, and without the testimony, evidence was insufficient to support finding that appellant was habitual felony offender). Cf. Yisrael v. State, 993 So.2d 952, 960 (Fla.2008) (holding that a DOC release-date.letter, standing alone, is not admissible as a business record or public record, but observing that a signed release-date letter, written under seal, may be used to authenticate and admit an attached DOC crime and time report). Accordingly, we reverse *780and remand for resentencing. The state is permitted to introduce additional evidence to establish that the appellant qualifies for enhanced sentencing. See State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985 (Fla.2008).
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.
GROSS, HAZOURI and CONNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Brown v. State, 113 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
Authorities Cited
- Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008)
- Despart v. State, 884 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- State v. Ransom Louis Collins, 985 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2008)
- King v. State, 590 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)