TORRENCE ANTOINE BATES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Torrence Bates appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that the jury instruction for manslaughter by act improperly required proof that he intended to kill the victim. The court agreed, finding the instruction constituted fundamental error under State v. Montgomery, and reversed his conviction and sentence for a new trial.
The instruction constituted fundamental error because it erroneously required proof of intent to kill for manslaughter by act, which improperly blurs the distinction between first-degree murder and manslaughter and imposes a more stringent intent requirement than second-degree murder requires. The error was fundamental because evidence was presented to substantiate the defendant's claim that the victim fired first.
[1] A jury instruction for manslaughter by act that requires proof of intent to kill the victim is erroneous.
[2] An erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter by act constitutes fundamental error when the evidence supports the defendant's claim that the victim fired first, causing t…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“to impose such a requirement on a finding of manslaughter by act would blur the distinction between first-degree murder and manslaughter. Moreover, it would impose a more stringent finding of intent upon manslaughter than upon second-degree murder, which, like manslaughter, does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim.”
Establishes the legal principle that manslaughter by act does not require proof of intent to kill, distinguishing it from first-degree murder.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBates was charged with first-degree felony murder with home invasion robbery as the predicate felony after Jose Godineaux was shot and killed in his a…
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Torrence Bates appeals his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence to forty years’ prison, asserting that the jury instruction given for manslaughter by act resulted in fundamental error. We agree, and we reverse Bates’ conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial. *70We find no merit to Bates’ remaining issue on appeal.
Bates was charged with first-degree felony murder with home invasion robbery as the underlying predicate felony offense. The victim, Jose Godineaux, was shot and killed inside his apartment. At trial, Bates testified in his defense that the victim fired a gun first and that the bullet hit Bates’ gun causing it to discharge. The following instruction on manslaughter as a lesser included offense was provided to the jury:
To prove the crime of Manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. Jose Godineaux is dead.
2. Torrence A. Bates intentionally caused the death of Jose Godineaux.
(Emphasis added.)1 The jury found Bates guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder.
The supreme court held in State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010), that this type of jury instruction for manslaughter erroneously requires the jury to find that the defendant intended to kill the victim:
Although in some cases of manslaughter by act it may be inferred from the facts that the defendant intended to kill the victim, to impose such a requirement on a finding of manslaughter by act would blur the distinction between first-degree murder and manslaughter. Moreover, it would impose a more stringent finding of intent upon manslaughter than upon second-degree murder, which, like manslaughter, does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim. Thus, we conclude that under Florida law, the crime of manslaughter by act does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim.
Id. at 256. Because Bates failed to contemporaneously object to the erroneous instruction, we apply a fundamental error analysis to determine whether the error “ ‘reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’ ” Id. at 258 (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991)).
We conclude based on the facts of this case, where evidence was presented at trial to substantiate Bates’ claim that the victim fired first, causing Bates’ gun to discharge, that the erroneous jury instruction amounted to fundamental error.2 We therefore reverse Bates’ conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
DAVIS and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
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Bates v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (M.D. Fla. 2023)…d found “nothing that 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 Bates had previously been convicted of the same offense, but the conviction was vacated on appeal because of an erroneous jury instruction on “manslaughter by act.” Bates v. State, 100 So. 3d 69, 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). would support a motion to suppress [the] confession.” (Id., p. 141.) The court then asked Bates a series of questions about the interview. Following this colloquy, the court indicated its desire to avoid “a [Rule 3.]850 issu…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010)
- D'Angelo v. State, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Batraville Vincent Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- In re Standard Jury Instructions IN Crim. Cases-Report NO. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2008)
- Fagner Barros-Dias v. State, 41 So. 3d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)