CHRISTOPHER JOHNS, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL G. PENZOTTI, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed an injunction for protection against repeat violence because the trial court failed to establish the requisite two incidents of violence or stalking directed at the petitioner.
An injunction for protection against repeat violence under Fla. Stat. § 784.046 requires competent, substantial evidence of two incidents of violence or stalking causing substantial emotional distress.
[1] An injunction for protection against repeat violence requires two incidents of violence or stalking, each directed at the petitioner or immediate family member, with evid…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChristopher Johns was subject to a trial court's final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence entered in favor of Daniel G. Pen…
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Christopher Johns challenges the trial court’s final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence entered against him in favor of Daniel G. Penzotti and the denial of his motion for rehearing of that injunction. Because the requisite instances of violence or stalking were not established at the hearing, we reverse.
Section 784.046, Florida Statutes (2011), provides that a person may obtain protection against “repeat violence,” which is defined as “two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent ... directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member.” (Emphasis added.) A person commits the act of stalking by “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following], harassing], or cy-berstalkfing] another person.” § 784.048(2) (emphasis added). Harassment is defined as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a); see also Jones v. Jackson, 67 So.3d 1203, 1203-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing order granting injunction for protection against repeat violence because incidents alleged to be harassment “would not have caused a reasonable person substantial emotional distress”).
Because the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support an injunction for repeat violence based on reasonable, substantial emotional distress caused by multiple instances of stalking by harassment, we reverse.
Reversed.
SILBERMAN, C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., Concur.