G.O., THE MOTHER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed the trial court's order on exceptions to a general magistrate's report, finding that child support modification should be retroactive to the date of the second amended petition, not the initial petition, and reversed the denial of the mother's request for attorney's fees and costs.
The court held that child support modification should be retroactive to the date of the second amended petition, not the initial petition, and reversed the denial of the mother's request for attorney's fees and costs.
Following a mediation agreement, the mother moved for child support modification. Her initial petition was dismissed for failure to perfect service wi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Constructive Consent cases and more on FLexlaw
The Department of Children and Family Services filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights against G.O. (Mother) and C.O. (Father). The general magistrate held an advisory hearing on March 27, 2012. Mother and Father did not appear, despite being served with a summons. Pursuant to section 39.808(d), Florida Statutes (2011), the general magistrate found constructive consent for termination of parental rights. On May 1, 2012, the general magistrate held a hearing where a guardian ad litem testified as to the best interests of the children. The general magistrate recommended that the trial court terminate parental rights, and the trial judge signed the order terminating parental rights. Mother now appeals.
Rule 8.257(h), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure (2011), prohibits general magistrates from presiding over adjudicatory hearings under section 89.809, Florida Statutes (2011). Section 39.809(3) also states, in pertinent part, “[t]he adjudicatory hearing must be conducted by the judge without a jury-” Fla. Stat. § 39.809(3) (2011). The May 1, 2012 hearing was an adjudicatory hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights; therefore, the trial court should have presided over the hearing.
Accordingly, we reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for proper re-notice to the mother for any further hearings, including a new advisory hearing. Reversed and remanded.