STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ORLANDO LOCKETT, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence from a vehicle stop based on the officer's violation of a noise statute that was later declared unconstitutional. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the officer acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute that was constitutional at the time of the stop, even though it was declared unconstitutional years later.
The court reversed the suppression order, holding that when the stop occurred in 2008, a reasonable police officer would not have known the noise statute was unconstitutional and therefore acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Good faith reliance on a statute that is later declared unconstitutional justifies the stop and does not warrant suppression of evidence.
[1] A statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle with music plainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more is unconstitutional as a content-based restriction on f…
[2] A statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle with music plainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when Lockett was stopped in 2008, almost three years before the decision in Catalano, a reasonable police officer would not have known that the noise statute was unconstitutional, and that the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner”
Establishes the good faith reliance doctrine applied by the court—officers cannot be faulted for stops made under statutes that were valid when the stop occurred, even if later declared unconstitutional
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 20, 2008, a police officer stopped Orlando Lockett's vehicle after hearing music from approximately seventy-five feet away. Lockett was charg…
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The state appeals the county court’s order granting Orlando Lockett’s motion to suppress evidence obtained when his vehicle was stopped for a violation of section 316.3045(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2008).1 Because the trial judge granted the motion based upon a ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, this court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (2012).
Lockett was stopped on March 20, 2008, when a police officer heard music playing from Lockett’s car from about seventy-five feet away. Lockett was charged with driving while his license was suspended and for playing loud music which was audible from more than twenty-five feet away in violation of section 316.3045. The charge under section 316.3045 was subsequently dismissed and the suspended license charge was transferred to county court for jury trial.
*1276Almost three years after Lockett was stopped, the Second District decided in State v. Catalano, 60 So.3d 1139, 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), that section 316.3045 “is a content-based restriction on free expression which violates the First Amendment” because its provisions do not apply to motor vehicles used for business or political purposes. The Catalano court also approved the decision of the lower court that the statute’s “plainly audible” standard was unconstitutionally vague and over-broad. Id. at 1142-44. After the decision in Catalano, Lockett filed his motion to suppress alleging the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion for the stop. At the hearing, after testimony was presented, he also argued the unconstitutionality of the noise statute. The state responded by citing Montgomery v. State, 69 So.3d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), in which the district court held that the stop was made in good faith reliance on the statute which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1033. The trial court granted the motion.
As in Montgomery and State v. Conley, 98 So.3d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), we conclude that when Lockett was stopped in 2008, almost three years before the decision in Catalano, a reasonable police officer would not have known that the noise statute was unconstitutional, and that the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner.
Therefore, we reverse the order granting Lockett’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
TAYLOR, DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Summer Allen, 110 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…icion for the stop of her vehicle. The lower court granted Allen’s motion to suppress and the State appeals. We reverse because the officer operated on a good faith basis that the statute was constitutional at the time of the stop. State v. Lockett, 101 So. 3d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (concluding that, “before the decision in Catalano, a reasonable police officer would not have known that the noise statute was unconstitutional”). We remand for further consideration of Allen’s motion to suppress. See id.…
Authorities Cited
- Montgomery v. State, 69 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
- State v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
- State v. Lapar Donta Conley, 98 So. 3d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)