THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,

v.

ROLANDO MARTINEZ, APPELLEE

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

As a result of an incident on May 17, 2010, in which the defendant-appellee struck his wife with a hot iron leaving a permanent burn mark on her leg, he was charged with one count of simple battery and two of aggravated battery. Before trial, however, the defendant entered into a bargain in which he pled to one count of simple battery and one count of aggravated battery in return for a withhold of adjudication and — although the sentencing guidelines for the charges yielded a minimum sentence of 21.15 months in state prison — two years probation. Within two months, however, as found by the trial court in a now-uncontested ruling, Martinez violated his probation in several material respects. Because aggravated battery is a qualifying offense under the Anti-Murder Act, § 948.06(8)(c)3., Fla. Stat. (2009),1 and he was also found to be— again, without present dispute — an unreasonable danger to the community, § 948.06(8)(e)l., Fla. Stat. (2009), and thus rendered a “violent felony offender of special concern,” the court was called upon to sentence him under section 948.06(8)(e)2.a., Florida Statutes (2009), which provides:

If the court has found that a violent felony offender of special concern [like Martinez] poses a danger to the community, the court shall revoke probation and shall sentence the offender up to the statutory maximum, or longer if permitted by law.

On the stated basis that this provision does not require the application of the guidelines2 and even without consideration of *1015the facts that (a) even if he had not been placed on and violated probation, the “bottom” of the guidelines was 21.15 months in state prison, and (b) once more without dispute, no valid basis for a downward departure was established in any way,3 the trial court, having revoked probation, sentenced Martinez to only B64 days in the county jail, followed by reinstatement of probation.4 The State appeals pursuant to section 924.07(l)(i), Florida Statutes (2010), and we reverse.

That error was committed below is conclusively established, without more, by section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2009), which provides:

The Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1,1998.

See also § 775.082(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“The Criminal Punishment Code applies to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998. Any revision to the Criminal Punishment Code applies to sentencing for all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after the effective date of the revision.”); § 921.0024(l)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2009) (section entitled “Criminal Punishment Code; worksheet computations; scoresheets,” providing for additional points “[i]f the community sanction violation is committed by a violent felony offender of special concern, as defined in s. 94-8.06” (emphasis added)). This statute, which could not be more categorical, unconditional, or unambiguous, clearly establishes that the code and the guidelines do apply to this case.5 *1016Indeed, they apply in spades.6 The Anti-Murder Act was specifically passed to prevent just the kind of thing that occurred below. It was designed to obviate the thought-to-be undesirable spectacle of a person on probation for a designated serious crime violating that trust only to be restored to the same or equivalent status. The result below is in flagrant violation of that legislative objective. It is inconeeiva-*1017ble that the legislature would have countenanced an end run around the statute by permitting instead the miscreant to be sentenced to prison (or, as here, jail) for any period, however short — 364 days, 60 days, or 60 minutes — solely within the presumably unreviewable discretion of the trial court.7 Martinez initially escaped a 21.15 month sentence because the State agreed to a downward departure as part of a plea bargain. See § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009); State v. Pita, 54 So.3d 557, 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Here, having broken his side of the bargain, and over the protest of the State, he has actually come out better than he would have in the first place. We cannot approve such a conclusion. See Gracia v. State, 98 So.3d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citing Doctor v. State, 677 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (special concurrence), approved, 698 So.2d 1224 (Fla.1997)).

Sentence reversed and remanded for re-sentencing under the guidelines.