WILLIE FOSTER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Foster appealed the denial of his Rule 3.800 motion seeking additional pre-sentencing jail time credit. The court reversed and remanded because the trial court summarily denied relief without attaching record excerpts to conclusively show Foster was not entitled to relief, violating the appellate standard of review.
The trial court must reverse and remand because the limited record fails to show conclusively that Foster is not entitled to relief. The trial court, not the Department of Corrections, is responsible for determining pre-sentencing jail time credit, and on appeal from summary denial of a Rule 3.800 motion, reversal is required unless the post-conviction record conclusively shows the defendant is entitled to no relief.
[1] A trial court is responsible for determining pre-sentencing jail time credit, not the Department of Corrections.
[2] An appellate court must reverse a summary denial of a motion for post-conviction relief unless the record conclusively shows the defendant is entitled to no relief.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court, not the Department of Corrections, is responsible for pre-sentencing jail time credit.”
Establishes that the trial court improperly delegated its responsibility to determine jail credit to the Department of Corrections.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFoster was incarcerated in county jail for 934 days before sentencing on three case numbers but received only 577 days of jail credit. He filed a Rule…
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ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We grant the State’s motion for rehearing, withdraw the opinion issued on No*7vember 7, 2012, and substitute the following opinion in its stead.
Willie Foster appeals an order denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 motion for credit for time served. Because the record before us fails to conclusively refute Foster’s claim that he is entitled to an additional 357 days of pre-sentencing jail time credit, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In his Rule 3.800 motion, Foster alleged that he was incarcerated in the county jail for a total of 934 days before sentencing on case numbers F09-105547, F09-22090 and F11-13853B, but that he received only 577 days of jail credit for his sentences on those case numbers. Foster set forth the date of his presentence incarceration and his calculation of the credit to which he believes he is entitled. Foster did not attach any documents to the motion, but further alleged that the court file and jail records would conclusively demonstrate the error in jail credit that he had received. Upon treating the motion as facially sufficient, the trial court summarily denied relief without explanation or attachment of any portion of the record to support its finding, and instead referred the matter to the Department of Corrections to determine the proper amount of presen-tencing jail time credit that Foster should receive. Foster appealed.
“The trial court, not the Department of Corrections, is responsible for pre-sentencing jail time credit.” See Monroe v. State, 842 So.2d 265, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Moreover, on appeal from a summary denial of a Rule 3.800 motion, this court must reverse unless the post-conviction record, see Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), shows conclusively that the defendant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D). The limited record before us-which consists only of Foster’s motion and the brief order-fails to show that Foster is not entitled to relief.1 For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the post-conviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that Foster is not entitled to any relief.2
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hagans v. State, 114 So. 3d 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…g Ha-gans’s waiver of entitlement to credit for time served; alternatively, if Hagans did not clearly waive this right on the record, then he is entitled to the award of such.1 Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D); Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(i); Foster v. State, 106 So. 3d 6, 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Shea v. State, 97 So. 3d 861, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. SAWAYA, PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur. . The holding in this matter is not inconsistent with our decision in Jarrett v.…
Authorities Cited
- Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011)
- Monroe v. State, 842 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)