EDDIE BOYD, APPELLANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eddie Boyd's postconviction relief motion was dismissed as untimely, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the relevant date for sentencing finality is when the written order is filed, not when sentence is orally pronounced. Boyd's May 9, 2012 motion was timely filed within two years of the August 30, 2011 written sentencing order.
Boyd's postconviction relief motion was timely. The relevant date for finality of a sentencing order is the date the written order is filed with the court, not the date on which the sentence is orally pronounced. Boyd's May 9, 2012 motion was well within the two-year deadline measured from August 30, 2011.
[1] The finality of a sentencing order for purposes of postconviction relief is determined by the date the written order is filed, not the date of oral pronouncement.
[2] A postconviction motion is timely if filed within two years of the date a sentencing order becomes final.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The relevant date for finality of a sentencing order is the date the written order is filed, not the date on which the sentence is orally pronounced.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for determining when a sentencing order becomes final for purposes of calculating the deadline to file postconviction relief.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoyd was originally sentenced and later successfully challenged a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) designation on direct appeal. The original sentenci…
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Eddie Boyd challenges the summary dismissal of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, as untimely. Boyd correctly asserts that his sentencing order was not rendered until August 30, 2011, and thus his postconviction motion filed on May 9, 2012, was timely.
The procedural history of Boyd’s case is admittedly confusing; the following account is somewhat abridged. After Boyd successfully challenged the prison releasee reoffender (PRR) designation on one of his sentences in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), on direct appeal this court remanded for resentencing because Boyd had been illegally resentenced by a successor judge without a showing that the original sentencing judge was unavailable. Boyd v. State, 988 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), abrogated on procedural grounds by Pifer v. State, 59 So.3d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). As a result of that proceeding, the original sentencing judge orally resentenced Boyd on November 17, 2008, again removing the PRR designation from the battery on a law enforcement offieer charge. However, no written sentence was filed at that time. The relevant date for finality of a sentencing order is the date the written order is filed, not the date on which the sentence is orally pronounced. See Weiss v. State, 720 So.2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); see also Fla. R.App.P. 9.020(i).1
Boyd then filed a motion for post-conviction relief on January 2, 2011, and appealed the order denying his motion. This court dismissed the appeal as premature after ascertaining that Boyd’s written sentences were not filed with the circuit court clerk until August 30, 2011, and specifically ruled that Boyd could file a rule 3.850 motion within two years of the date that the sentences became final. Boyd v. State, 83 So.3d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Boyd’s postconviction motion filed on May 9, 2012, was well within the time limit. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the postconviction court to address the merits of Boyd’s motion for postconviction relief.
Reversed and remanded.
DAVIS and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Caballero-Rayes v. State, 122 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…s untimely, the postcon-viction court incorrectly relied on the date the judge signed the judgment and sentence — April 26, 2010 — rather than the date it was filed with the clerk of the court-May 3, 2010. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(i); Boyd v. State, 106 So. 3d 11, 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“The relevant date for finality of a sentencing order is the date the written order is filed.”). The record indicates that Caballero-Rayes did not appeal his judgment and sentence, which thus became final on June 2, 2010, thi…
Authorities Cited
- Weiss v. State, 720 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Pifer v. State, 59 So. 3d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
- Lowrance v. State, 988 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
- Boyd v. State, 988 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)