JANA M. LANTZ, APPELLANT,

v.

DR. ERIC J. SMITH, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE

PER CURIAM.

Jana M. Lantz, Appellant, appeals from a final order of the Education Practices Commission (Commission). Appellant raises three arguments, but we find merit in only one. We conclude that the Commission abused its discretion when it improperly rejected or modified a number of the pivotal factual findings in the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) recommended order. Accordingly, we reverse.

The Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) filed an administrative complaint against Appellant, a teacher in the Miami-Dade County School District. The administrative complaint alleged Appellant acted in an unprofessional manner toward a colleague (Ms. Wallace) and a member of the school’s administration in the presence of students, engaged in conduct that seriously reduced her effectiveness as an employee, and failed to protect students from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the students’ mental health, physical health or safety.1

The case proceeded to a formal administrative hearing during which the ALJ *520heard conflicting testimony from several witnesses and reviewed documents that were entered into evidence. After the formal administrative hearing, the ALJ issued a comprehensive recommended order finding that after Ms. Wallace used Appellant’s classroom for a portion of the day to administer standardized tests, Appellant returned to the classroom, was displeased to find the desks and tables not in their normal places, and complained loudly that Ms. Wallace had not rearranged the room as promised. The ALJ found the two briefly disagreed over the location of the furniture in the classroom and whose job it was to restore the original configuration. The ALJ determined that Ms. Wallace’s testimony regarding her fear for the safety of herself and students to be disingenuous and concluded that the “incident was neither as intense as Ms. Wallace described it, nor was Ms. Wallace as free of responsibility for causing the incident, or escalating the exchange.”

The ALJ concluded that there was “no basis to find any impact to the students who may have witnessed all or part of a frustrated exchange between two teachers during the week of FCAT testing.” The ALJ also concluded that the Commissioner failed to prove that 1) Appellant was guilty of gross immorality or an act of moral turpitude; 2) “whatever the students witnessed of the confrontation between” Appellant and Ms. Wallace or the dismissive treatment by Appellant of an assistant principal rose to the level of a condition harmful to learning or to the students’ mental or physical, health or safety, or that Appellant intentionally exposed her students to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. Finally, the ALJ concluded that the “brief exchange did not rise to the level of interfering with either employee’s discharge of her professional responsibilities or creating a hostile, intimidating, abusive, offensive, or oppressive environment.” Consequently, the ALJ recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed.

The Commissioner filed exceptions to the recommended order. The Commission held a hearing and entered a final order in which it rejected or modified a number of the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. With regard to each of the Commissioner’s eight exceptions to findings of fact, the final order states the Commission “accepted” the exception, “finding there is no[ ] competent and substantial evidence to support the findings of fact in the Recommended Order based on [the Commissioner’s] written argument attached and incorporated herein.” The Commission then adopted the “material allegations in the Administrative Complaint” as its findings of fact.2 On this basis, the Commission *521rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and instead issued a letter of reprimand, placed Appellant on two years’ probation, and imposed an administrative fine.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the Commission improperly rejected or modified a number of the pivotal factual findings. Appellant asserts that the case was “primarily one of the weight or credibility” given to the testimony of herself and Ms. Wallace, and that determination of credibility is a matter that “lies with the [ALJ] ” and “is not within the authority of the [C]ommission to reject or modify.” We agree.

Section 120.57(1)0), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that the agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record that the findings of fact were not based upon competent, substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply -with the essential requirements of law. If the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence, the agency cannot reject them even to make alternate findings that are also supported by competent, substantial evidence. Resnick v. Flagler Cnty. Sch. Bd., 46 So.3d 1110, 1112-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“In a fact-driven case such as this, where an employee’s conduct is at issue, great weight is given to the findings of the [ALJ], who has the opportunity to hear the witnesses’ testimony and evaluate their credibility.”). “Credibility of the witnesses is a matter that is within the province of the [ALJ], as is the weight to be given the evidence.” Stinson v. Winn, 938 So.2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). “The [ALJ] is entitled to rely on the testimony of a single witness even if that testimony contradicts the testimony of a number of other witnesses.” Id. An agency abuses its discretion when it improperly rejects the ALJ’s findings. Res-nick, 46 So.3d at 1113.

We conclude the Commission abused its discretion when it modified the factual findings in the recommended order.3 The ALJ’s findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence. The ALJ was entitled to rely on the testimony of a single -witness even if that testimony contradicts the testimony of a number of other witnesses. Because the ALJ’s findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence, the Commission could not reject or modify them as was done in the final order.4 Accordingly, we reverse *522the final order of the Commission and remand the ease for entry of an order dismissing the administrative complaint, consistent with the recommendation of the ALJ.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

BENTON, C.J., LEWIS and ROWE, JJ., concur.