WAYNE TOVER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Wayne Tover sought a writ of prohibition to overturn the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss based on Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' immunity law (§ 776.032). The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial, finding no abuse of discretion in the court's factual determinations that Tover's fear of imminent harm was not reasonable under the circumstances.
The trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss was not in error. The court properly applied the Stand Your Ground law by conducting an evidentiary hearing, making factual findings supported by competent, substantial evidence, and reasonably concluding that Tover's fear was not reasonable under the facts. However, Tover may raise the Stand Your Ground defense at trial.
[1] Prohibition is the appropriate vehicle for review of a trial court's denial of a pretrial motion based on immunity under Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law.
[2] A trial court's findings of fact in a "Stand Your Ground" immunity hearing are subject to deferential review if supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The various witnesses who testified and the other evidence created a conflict as to how the events leading up to the shooting actually took place. The trial court resolved the contradictions adversely to petitioner, finding that under the facts, his fear of imminent death or great bodily harm was not reasonable.”
Establishes that the trial court's factual findings were based on resolving evidentiary conflicts and support the denial of immunity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTover shot toward another vehicle at a traffic light, claiming the occupant of that vehicle attempted to enter his vehicle. At an evidentiary hearing,…
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Petitioner Wayne Tover seeks either a writ of certiorari or prohibition to review the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss based on immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2012), the “Stand Your Ground” law. We have previously found prohibition to be the appropriate vehicle for review of such claims. Joseph v. State, 103 So.3d 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Petitioner asserts that he was reasonably in fear of imminent death or great bodily harm due to an occupant of another vehicle attempting to enter petitioner’s vehicle while both were stopped at a traffic light. According to petitioner, this fact triggered a statutory presumption under section 776.013(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), that his fear was reasonable, thus allowing him to use deadly force (shooting towards the other vehicle) in defense of himself. See § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat. (2012) (permitting use of deadly force under the circumstances set forth in section 776.013).
An evidentiary hearing was held in the trial court. The various witnesses who testified and the other evidence created a conflict as to how the events leading up to the shooting actually took place. The trial court resolved the contradictions adversely to petitioner, finding that under the facts, his fear of imminent death or great bodily harm was not reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to statutory immunity from prosecution under section 776.031. In Joseph, we found that the appropriate standard of review was to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact where supported by competent, substantial evidence, but to review conclusions of law de novo. Applying this standard, we hold that the trial court’s decision to deny petitioner’s motion to dismiss was not in error, and so we deny the petition for writ of prohibition sought by petitioner. However, this decision is without prejudice to petitioner raising the Stand Your Ground statutory defense at trial. See Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456, 459-460 (Fla.2010), approving Peterson v. State, 983 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Mederos v. State, 102 So.3d 7 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
Denied without prejudice.
WARNER, DAMOORGIAN, and GERBER, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Armstrong v. State, 120 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…ment to immunity. Johnson v. State, 65 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). The court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence and will not be disturbed. Joseph v. State, 103 So. 3d 227, 228-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Tover v. State, 106 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Denial of this petition is without prejudice to petitioner raising this statutory defense at trial if he so chooses, Tover, 106 So. 3d at 959; accord Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Denied with…
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Rodriguez v. State, 127 So. 3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…, 120 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing Joseph, 103 So. 3d at 228-29). Denial of this petition is without prejudice to petitioner raising the statutory defense at trial if he so chooses. Armstrong, 120 So. 3d at 113 (citing Tover v. State, 106 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). Denied without prejudice. DAMOORGIAN, C.J., WARNER and GERBER, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010)
- Zack Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
- Joseph v. State, 103 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)