JOY HINZMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
WINTER HAVEN FACILITY OPERATIONS LLC D/B/A CONSULATE HEALTH CARE OF WINTER HAVEN AND GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., APPELLEES
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In this workers' compensation case, the court reversed the Judge of Compensation Claims' interpretation that the "5 days" in Florida Statutes section 440.13(2)(f) means business days rather than calendar days. The court held that the plain language of the statute requires carriers to authorize an alternative physician within five consecutive calendar days in response to an injured employee's written request for a change of physician.
The court held that "5 days" in section 440.13(2)(f) means five consecutive calendar days, not business days. The plain meaning of the unmodified term "days" in the statute, read in light of the Legislature's use of "business days" elsewhere in section 440.13, demonstrates the Legislature's intent to limit the time period to five consecutive calendar days.
[1] The plain meaning of statutory language should be relied upon without resorting to rules of construction or speculation as to legislative intent when the language is clea…
[2] Statutory language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may not add words not included by the legislature.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous, courts should rely on the words used in the statute without involving rules of construction or speculating as to the legislature's intent. Courts should give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not add words that were not included by the legislature.”
Establishes the plain language rule of statutory interpretation that the court applied to determine the meaning of 'days' in the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn injured employee (claimant) requested a change of physician from the workers' compensation carrier. The carrier interpreted section 440.13(2)(f), F…
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In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) in which he ruled that the “5 days” in section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2011), means business days rather than calendar days. We reverse this ruling because the plain meaning of the statute reveals the Legislature’s intent to limit to five consecutive days, or calendar days, the time period within which a “carrier shall authorize an alternative physician who shall not be professionally affiliated with the previous physician” in response to an injured employee’s written request for a change of physician. See Germ v. St. Luke’s Hosp. Ass’n, 998 So.2d 576, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“If the statute’s plain language is clear and unambiguous, courts should rely on the words used in the statute without involving rules of construction or speculating as to the legislature’s intent. Courts should give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not add words that were not included by the legislature.” (citations omitted)). Seen another way, because the Legislature specified “business days” elsewhere in section 440.13, canons of statutory interpretation (particularly the presumption of consistent usage) dictate that the Legislature’s use of the unmodified term “days” here refers to consecutive or calendar days. Although the Legislature used the terms “calendar days” and “consecutive days” in other sections of chapter 440, the wording of those statutes, unrelated to the topic of this statute (permitting injured employees to request “one change of physician during the course of treatment for any one accident” regardless of medical necessity for such), does not affect the analysis of the statute in question here. Policy concerns asserted by the Employer/Carrier here are more properly directed to the Legislature, to address or not, as it would choose. Cf. Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So.3d 792, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (declining to allow policy considerations to control outcome of case, and stating, “[t]hese policy arguments should be directed to the Legislature, not this court”).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CLARK, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.
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Debrah Gadol v. Masoret Yehudit, 132 So. 3d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…sponse does not require the E/C to actually contact or schedule an appointment with the new doctor. See id. The five-day response period in this statute refers to calendar days, not business days. See Hinzman v. Winter Haven Facility Operations LLC, 109 So. 3d 256, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). The JCC here ruled, I interpret the statute (‘the employee may select the physician’) and the Pruitt [v. Southeast Personnel Leasing, Inc., 33 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010),] decision to give the claimant the right to se…
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Milovan Zekanovic v. Am. II, 208 So. 3d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…to that request within five calendar days, the claimant may select the physician and that physician shall be considered authorized if the treatment provided is compensable and medically necessary. See Hinzman v. Winter Haven Facility Operations LLC, 109 So. 3d 256, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). The JCC’s reasoning here, which is that Claimant’s failure to timely exercise his right to select his physician returned that right to the E/C, runs afoul of this court’s case law. Most recently, in Gadol v. Masoret Yehudi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Staffmark and Avizent/Frank Gates v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)