GLENDA MARTINEZ, PETITIONER,
v.
JOHN CRAMER AND J. ALAN SMITH, RESPONDENTS
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Glenda Martinez petitioned for a writ of prohibition to disqualify a trial judge from presiding over guardianship proceedings where she is the healthcare surrogate. The appellate court granted the petition, finding that the judge's conduct—ejecting the petitioner from court, striking her testimony, and making disparaging personal comments—would reasonably cause a prudent person to fear she could not receive a fair hearing.
The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition. The judge's combined acts of ejecting the petitioner, striking her testimony based on perceived insult, and making personal comments about her appearance and demeanor exceeded what is necessary for courtroom control and evidenced bias sufficient to require disqualification, even if the judge subjectively felt he had no bias.
[1] A motion to disqualify a judge is legally sufficient if the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.
[2] The test for disqualification focuses on the litigant's reasonable fear of unfairness, not the judge's subjective belief about their impartiality.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial”
This establishes the legal standard for determining whether disqualification is warranted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring guardianship proceedings, the trial judge ejected Petitioner Martinez from the courtroom. The judge later struck her testimony based on what he…
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Petitioner, Glenda Martinez, petitions for writ of prohibition to prevent the trial judge from presiding over further proceedings in the guardianship of the petitioner’s spouse, for whom she is the designated healthcare surrogate. We grant the petition.
The substantive test for whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient is “whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Santisteban v. State, 72 So.3d 187, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). “It is not a question of what the judge feels, but the feeling in the mind of the party seeking to disqualify and the basis for that feeling.” Corie v. City of Riviera Beach, 954 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). It must, however, be objectively reasonable. Foy v. State, 818 So.2d 704, 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The reasons for disqualification must also show personal bias or prejudice to the litigant.’ Levine v. State, 650 So.2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
We have reviewed the verified motion and the transcript of proceedings on which the motion was based. We conclude that the judge’s acts of ejecting petitioner from the courtroom, later striking her testimony on the basis of a perceived insult to him, and his comment that petitioner’s entire demeanor, including that “her face, her voice, her sound, maybe unpleasant to everyone else,” save the ward, would lead any reasonably prudent person to fear that she would not receive a fair hearing before the judge. See, e.g., Colarusso v. Colarusso, 20 So.3d 985, 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
Although respondent contends that a judge’s comments in the course of attempting to control the courtroom are ordinarily not legally sufficient to require disqualification, see Braddy v. State, 111 So.3d 810, 833-34, 2012 WL 5514368 (Fla. Nov. 15, 2012), we conclude that the judge’s actions as well as his personal comments about petitioner, when taken in combination, far exceeded comments or actions necessary to control his courtroom and were sufficient to evidence to a reasonable person bias requiring disqualification, even if the judge may have felt that he had no bias.
Therefore, we grant the petition but withhold the formal issuance of the writ, as we are sure that the trial judge will act in conformance with this opinion and remit his disqualification so that the matter may be assigned to a different judge.
MAY, C.J., WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Smith v. Smith, 224 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2017)…he Legislature for the improvement of guardianship 'and incapacity practice.” Ch. 2003-262, § 4(1), at 2712, Laws of Fla. . The presiding judge was subsequently disqualified for remarks made during this hearing regarding Glenda. Martinez v. Cramer, 111 So. 3d 206, 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).…
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Smith v. Smith, 199 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…e behaves herself, with her husband, because I think Mr. Smith still looks out to her_ (Emphasis added). After this hearing, however, the presiding judge was disqualified for remarks during this proceeding regarding Martinez. See Martinez v. Smith, 111 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). When Cramer was appointed ETG, the court also appointed an attorney for Smith, Lynne Hennessey. Almost immediately, Hennessy initiated a petition to annul the marriage based solely upon the allegation that court approval was no…
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Martinez v. The Guardianship OF J. Alan Smith, 159 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…nt counsel for the ward. See Martinez v. Cramer, 121 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Appellant also moved to disqualify the trial judge and filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this court, which petition was granted. See Martinez v. Cramer, 111 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Meanwhile, in the trial court, appellant also filed a response opposing Cramer’s petition for plenary guardianship. She gave four reasons for opposing the appointment of Cramer as plenary guardian. First, the court was required…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harrel Franklin Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2012)
- Levine v. State, 650 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Flavio Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
- FOY v. State, 818 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Corie v. City OF Riviera Beach, 954 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Colarusso v. Brenna Myers Colarusso, 20 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)