URSULA TERESA BARNES SKEEN, APPELLANT,
v.
LESTER L. MARX AND MABEL G. MARX, APPELLEES
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A Florida appellate court affirmed an adoption decree despite the natural mother's challenge to her consent. The court held that where a natural parent freely and knowingly consents to adoption and the adoptive parents accept and act upon that consent, the consent is ordinarily binding and cannot be withdrawn.
The court held that where a natural parent has freely and knowingly given the requisite consent to adoption and the adoptive parents have accepted and acted upon it, the consent is ordinarily binding and cannot be withdrawn. The trial court's findings that the consent was executed voluntarily with knowledge of its effect and without fraud, duress, or undue influence were supported by the record and warrant affirmance of the adoption decree.
“where a natural parent has freely and knowingly given the requisite consent to the adoption of his or her child and the adoptive parents have accepted and acted, then the consent is ordinarily binding and cannot be withdrawn.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that binding consent cannot be withdrawn once freely given and acted upon by adoptive parents.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA child was born out of wedlock on June 3, 1956. The natural mother initially signed a consent for adoption before birth. After the child was subseque…
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This appeal arose out of an adoption proceedings in which the appellant, the natural mother of the child, unsuccessfully contested the appellees’ petition for adoption.
The subject child was born out of wedlock June 3, 1956. Previous to birth of the child, the mother signed a consent for adoption of the child and the child was turned over to the parties pursuant to this understanding. Subsequently, the child was attempted to be returned to the mother; she could not or would not accept it; and it was placed with a local minister who contacted the appellees to see if they would care to adopt the child. Thereafter, the appellees employed an attorney who had the appellant come to his office where she voluntarily signed the consent for the appellees to adopt the child. This attorney testified that the agreement was either read by or to the appellant before she signed; she admits that she knew she' was signing adoption papers; but she contends that she was in a very nervous and emotionally upset condition so that she did not understand just what she was signing and that she thought that such an agreement would not preclude her from obtaining her child at a later date anyway, due to some magazine articles she had read.
The testimony was taken before a general master, and his findings were that the petitioners were suitable persons to adopt a child and that the consent for adoption was executed voluntarily with knowledge of the effect thereof, with no fraud, duress, or undue influence being practiced on the mother. The master recommended the adoption be granted; his recommendations were approved; and the final decree was entered granting such adoption by the circuit judge.
The appellant quotes from 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Children § 21, to the effect that consent for adoption may be withdrawn at any time before the adoption decree, but con*518cedes that Florida follows the opposite view. See Petition of Gaban, 1947, 158 Fla. 597, 30 So.2d 176, 179, where the Florida Supreme Court said:
“Some reputable authorities hold that natural parents can or may withdraw or revoke their written consent previously given to the adoption of their minor child or children at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of adoption. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Children, § 21, p. 386. The trend of the most recent authority, however, is toward the position that where a natural parent has freely and knowingly given the requisite consent to the adoption of his or her child and the adoptive parents have accepted and acted, then the consent is ordinarily binding and cannot be withdrawn. 156 A.L.R. 1011. It is the conclusion of the writer that the latter rule is here inapplicable because the requisite consent of the mother, as disclosed by the record, was not freely and knowingly obtained so as to fall within the rule.”
The Court concluded the above opinion by reversing the circuit judge, but on rehearing, a majority of the court reached the conclusion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Subsequent to Petition of Gaban, supra, the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Pugh v. Barwick, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 124, affirmed an adoption decree where a mother obj ected to such adoption though she had informally agreed to such adoption.
We have noted the other question in the record, but do not find reversible error appearing herein. The lower court should be and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
KNOTT, JAMES R., and STEPHENSON, GUNTER, Associate Judges, concur.
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Grabovetz v. Sachs, 262 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…t aside for unsubstantial reasons. In Re Adoption of Mason, 34 Fla.Supp. 13 (Cir.Ct.1970). The courts have consistently held these consents to be valid and binding. In Re Adoption of Arnold, Fla.App.1966, 184 So. 2d 192; Skeen v. Marx, Fla.App.1958, 105 So. 2d 517. It is conceded that both sets of parents are qualified, however, the answers to legal questions concerning the validity of the consents for adoption signed by appellant are controlling. It is well stated that the chancellor’s decision comes to thi…
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In the Interest of I.B.J. v. Child's. Home Soc'y OF Fla., 497 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…to section 63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1985), or if the consent document was executed without full knowledge of its effect. See Grabovetz v. Sachs, 262 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); In re Arnold, 184 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Skeen v. Marx, 105 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). The trial court determined that the natural mother understood the documents and their effect; that there was no showing of fraud or duress and denied the mother’s motion to withdraw. We find this to be error. We note first that…1 / 2
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In re Adoption OF Deborah Ann Arnold, 184 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)…eir child to be adopted by others. The courts have consistently held such consents valid and binding when they involve illegitimate children and when the mother and the adoptive parents are total strangers to each other. Skeen v. Marx, Fla.App.1958, 105 So. 2d 517. In the matter before the court here, however, we have a relationship of the grandparents attempting to adopt their grandchild over the objection of the natural mother. The strained relationship between the parties, the age and intellectual immatur…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Petition OF LEE Gaban and Clorene Gaban, 158 Fla. 597 (Fla. 1947)