KENNETH PATTERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Kenneth Patterson challenges his life sentence imposed as a prison release reoffender (PRR), arguing the trial court failed to properly re-pronounce the PRR designation during resentencing in 2004. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirms the denial of Patterson's motion to correct an illegal sentence but remands for the circuit court to correct a scrivener's error by properly marking the PRR box on the sentencing order.
The court affirms the denial of Patterson's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the trial court had no discretion to eliminate the PRR designation—it could only delete the HVFO designation as this court had previously remanded. However, the court remands to correct the scrivener's error of failing to check the PRR box on the sentencing order.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be summarily denied if the allegations are frivolous or the record c…
[2] A trial court's deletion of a habitual violent felony offender designation from a sentence, without conducting a new sentencing hearing, is not inherently illegal.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We distinguish this case from those defendant cited in that in those cases, the various sentencing courts had discretion to impose a sentence without habitualization, but the trial court in this case had no discretion to sentence defendant without PRR status; defendant already had been sentenced as a PRR, and this court's decision requiring resentencing did not authorize the trial court to do anything other than to maintain that sentence, eliminating only the habitual sentence.”
Establishes the critical distinction that the trial court was not authorized to remove the PRR enhancement, only the HVFO designation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatterson was convicted of robbery with a firearm in 1998 and sentenced to life imprisonment as both a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and a p…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Habitual Violent Felony Offender (Hvfo) cases and more on FLexlaw
Kenneth Patterson (Defendant) appeals an order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence, filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We affirm, but remand for the circuit court to correct a scrivener’s error.
In 1998, following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of robbery with a firearm. He was sentenced to life in prison both as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and as a prison release reoffender (PRR).
Thereafter, on appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s rule 3.850 mo*265tion, this court remanded for resentencing only as a PRR, consistent with Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000). Patterson v. State, 860 So.2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In March 2004, the trial court deleted the HVFO designation. No appeal was taken from that order.
In the instant rule 3.800(a) motion filed in 2012, defendant now challenges his life sentence, claiming the trial court in 2004 failed to orally pronounce any enhancement penalty. The written sentence was consistent. Among the documents which defendant attached to his motion were: a copy of the March 3, 2004 order deleting the habitual offender designation from the sentence; a new sentencing order dated March 3, 2004, containing a note at the top reading “ * Habitual Offender Deleted *,” but leaving the box next to “PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER” unchecked; and, a court disposition order dated March 3, 2004, providing only “life sentence to remain only delete the habitual offender.” Defendant argued that because his sentencing guidelines scoresheet generated a maximum sentence of less than ten years, and the trial court did not orally pronounce the PRR designation, a life sentence could not legally be imposed. Defendant noted in his motion that the sentencing error in his case was clear on the face of the record — he now was sentenced to life, but without any enhancement, which was an illegal sentence. He requested resentencing pursuant to the applicable guidelines. Defendant cited cases such as Akins v. State, 98 So.3d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing summary denial of 3.800(a) motion and holding that trial court, which imposed sentence on revocation of probation without mentioning defendant’s habitual felony offender status, then later modified sentence to clarify it was imposed as HFO sentence, violated double jeopardy), approved, 69 So.3d 261 (Fla.2011), and cases cited therein.
The trial court summarily denied the motion, explaining that deleting the habitual offender designation, rather than conducting a new sentencing hearing, was not illegal, and that the motion was frivolous.
This appeal followed. In his initial brief, defendant states that he was transported back to the Broward County Jail but a new sentencing hearing was not held; instead, the trial court merely stated that the HVFO designation was deleted. It did not re-pronounce the PRR life sentence but entered a written order reflecting a life term without any enhancing designation. This court had remanded for resentencing, but resentencing did not take place. The unenhanced life term, not as a PRR, exceeds the guidelines maximum sentence, which is less than ten years.
We distinguish this case from those defendant cited in that in those cases, the various sentencing courts had discretion to impose a sentence without habitualization, but the trial court in this case had no discretion to sentence defendant without PRR status; defendant already had been sentenced as a PRR, and this court’s decision requiring resentencing did not authorize the trial court to do anything other than to maintain that sentence, eliminating only the habitual sentence. Defendant’s allegation that no resentencing hearing was held only supports the conclusion that all the trial court did was delete the HVFO sentence.
Thus, we affirm, but direct the trial court on remand to correct the scrivener’s error in omitting to check the PRR box on the sentencing order.
Affirmed but Remanded.
WARNER, POLEN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Salvo v. State, 199 So. 3d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…e solely to correct the sentencing order by deleting the HFO and HVFO designations, while leaving the PRR designation unchanged. To accomplish this task, it shall not be necessary for the court to hold a resentencing hearing. See Patterson v. State, 114 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (resentencing hearing not required where, on remand, the sentencing court was not authorized to do anything other than maintain the PRR sentence and eliminate the HVFO sentence). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rema…
Authorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011)
- Patterson v. State, 860 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- WCI Cmtys., Inc. v. Colin Stafford, 98 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
- Akins v. State, 98 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)