CHAD LAMENT TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Chad Taylor appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed both the conviction and the enhanced prison release reoffender (PRR) sentence, rejecting Taylor's claim that the trial court should have given an afterthought instruction and his argument that his federal custody status disqualified him from PRR enhancement.
The trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to give an unrequested afterthought instruction that was inconsistent with Taylor's misidentification defense. Taylor qualified as a PRR because his constructive release from federal custody while housed in a county jail constitutes release from a federal correctional facility for purposes of the PRR statute.
[1] A trial court is not required to give an "afterthought" instruction when such an instruction is inconsistent with the defendant's trial defense and was not requested.
[2] A defendant's claim of misidentification at trial is inconsistent with a defense that the theft was an afterthought.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Inconsistencies in defenses are permitted so long as the proof of one does not necessarily disprove the other.”
Establishes the legal standard for when contradictory defenses are permissible at trial
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor was convicted of robbery with a weapon. The evidence showed that Taylor committed a battery against the victim followed by a theft. Taylor had …
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We affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon. He claims fundamental error where the trial court failed to give an afterthought instruction, as the theft upon which the robbery was based occurred after the battery of the victim. See Perkins v. State, 814 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). His defense at trial, however, was one of misidentification. Claiming that the theft was an afterthought was inconsistent with that defense. See Wright v. State, 705 So.2d 102, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“Inconsistencies in defenses are permitted so long as the proof of one does not necessarily disprove the other.”). Moreover, appellant never requested an afterthought instruction. Thus, it cannot be a fundamental error to fail to give an unrequested instruction inconsistent with his defense at trial.
As to appellant’s PRR sentence, we affirm based upon Louzon v. State, 78 So.3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), the reasoning of which we adopt. Here, appellant qualified as a PRR, because he committed the present offense within three years after his release from a federal correctional facility. Appellant was still in federal cus*356tody, even though housed in a Palm Beach County jail in order to perform substantial assistance. His release from federal custody while housed at the county jail still constitutes constructive release from a federal correctional facility for purposes of section 775.082(9)(a)(l) 1, Florida Statutes. As pointed out in Louzon,
To accept [the defendant’s] argument would place form over substance and would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s clear intent to provide for a greater sentence for individuals who commit a qualifying offense within three years of completion of a previously imposed prison sentence. To accept [his] argument would also mean that in order for the State to ensure that a defendant [in the defendant’s] situation was eligible for subsequent PRR sentencing, it would have to physically transfer an individual from jail to a Department of Corrections facility [or a federal correctional institution] — where the individual would then be entitled to an immediate release. Courts should not, construe a statute so as to achieve an absurd result.
Affirmed.
GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (12 total)
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State v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018)…trict Court of Appeal in Lewars v. State , 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1098, ---- So. 3d ----, 2017 WL 1969691 (Fla. 2d DCA May 12, 2017), which certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wright , 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), Taylor v. State , 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), and Louzon v. State , 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The certified conflict concerns the construction of one element of the definition of "prison releasee reoffender" provided in section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (20…
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State v. Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…reasoning, concluding that an offender inmate was released from a “federal correctional facility” because he “was still in federal custody, even though housed in a Palm Beach County jail in order to perform substantial assistance.” Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355, 355-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). It concluded that “release from federal custody while housed at the county jail still constitutes constructive release from a federal correctional facility for purposes of section 775.082(9)(a)(l), Florida Statutes.” Id.…1 / 2
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Johnson v. State, 260 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…jail time triggers PRR status. In State v. Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), we found the Fifth District’s reasoning in Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and the Fourth District’s reasoning in Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), persuasive in holding that the appellant, who was committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections and whose release facility was listed as the Department’s central office, should be considered a PRR notwithstanding…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wright v. State, 705 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)
- Perkins v. State, 814 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)