CURTIS STEVENS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Curtis Stevens was convicted of drug possession based solely on the fact that he possessed a key to an apartment where drugs were found in plain view. The court reversed his convictions, holding that mere access to a location—even through possession of a key—is insufficient to establish constructive possession without evidence of knowledge and dominion and control over the contraband.
No. The court held that constructive possession requires evidence of knowledge of the presence and dominion and control over the contraband. Mere access to premises, even through possession of a key, is insufficient to establish constructive possession without additional evidence demonstrating knowledge and control. The trial court should have granted Stevens's motions for judgment of acquittal.
[1] Mere access to a location where contraband is found, without more, is insufficient to establish constructive possession.
[2] Constructive possession requires proof that the defendant knew of the contraband's presence and had dominion and control over it.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“"constructive" possession, as the state claims in this case, requires, among other things, evidence that one knows of the presence and has dominion and control over the contraband.”
Establishes the legal standard for constructive possession under Florida law, requiring knowledge and control beyond mere access.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStevens had a key to an apartment but had not entered it. Drugs were discovered inside the apartment in plain view during a lawful search warrant exec…
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Stevens appeals from three convictions and a fifteen-year concurrent sentence for possession of cocaine, marijuana, and a controlled substance without a prescription. Because his trial motions for judgment of acquittal should have been granted, we reverse.
The only connection between Stevens and the drugs was that he had a key to, but had not entered the front door of the apartment in which the drugs were kept, in plain view.1 As in the cases of a next-door neighbor, a housekeeper, or a landlord who may have been given a key to certain premises and thus, has access to anything within, the fact that one has “access” to contraband or, as in this case, merely to the place where the contraband is located, is simply not a crime, or even an element of a crime, under the law of Florida. Specifically, “constructive” possession, as the state claims in this case, requires, among other things, evidence that one knows of the presence and has dominion and control over the contraband. There was no evidence of any of this at the trial. See Jennings v. State, - So.3d - (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); see also § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); People v. Macias, 299 Ill.App.3d 480, 233 Ill.Dec. 569, 701 N.E.2d 212 (1998) (state’s proffer of evidence that defendant had keys and thus had access to the apartment where narcotics were found, with nothing more, was insufficient to prove defendant had knowledge of the narcotics and control of the area where they were found); Commonwealth v. Sespedes, 442 Mass. 95, 810 N.E.2d 790 (2004) (defendant’s possession of keys to apartment where hidden drugs were discovered was, without more, insufficient to prove constructive possession). See generally Nicholas v. State, 47 So.3d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Loyd v. State, 677 So.2d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Green v. State, 667 So.2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Obviously distinguishable are (a) cases in which defendant’s possession of a key to the area is but one of several factors which, together, create a cognizable issue of guilt, see Greene v. State, 625 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Commonwealth v. Delarosa, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 623, 740 N.E.2d 1014 (2000); and (b) instances in which the defendant is found inside the room in which contraband is plainly- visible. See Bradshaw v. State, 509 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
In the absence of evidence of guilt, the convictions and sentence below are reversed with directions to discharge the defendant.
Reversed and remanded.2
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Alton Hill v. State, 667 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Green v. State, 667 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Bradshaw v. State, 509 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Loyd v. State, 677 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Nicholas v. State, 47 So. 3d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
- Gerry Greene v. State, 625 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)