IN RE CHARLES BUGGS, DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH LITA RENGIFO, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellant challenged a trial court's denial of her petition to approve a contingency fee contract with her attorney in a medical malpractice action. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court was required by rule to approve the petition if it determined the client understood her rights and the contract terms, and could not deny it without making factual findings and holding a hearing.
The trial court was required to approve the petition if it determined that the appellant understood her rights and the terms of the proposed contract. The use of 'shall' in the applicable rule creates a mandatory obligation that is not subject to judicial discretion.
[1] A trial court must approve a petition for attorney's fees under a contingency fee contract if the client demonstrates a complete understanding of their rights and the con…
[2] The word "shall" in a rule of procedure is mandatory and creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule provides that the trial court "shall" approve a petition "if the court determines the client has a complete understanding of the client's rights and the terms of the proposed contract."”
Establishes the mandatory nature of the approval requirement under Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii)
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant retained the Distasio Law Firm to represent her in a medical malpractice action. The firm required a 40% straight contingency fee arrang…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition for approval of an attorney’s fees contract. Because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of the applicable rule, we reverse.
Appellant chose the Distasio Law Firm to represent her in a medical malpractice action. Due to the nature of her claim, the firm would only represent her if she agreed to a straight 40% contingency fee. Pursuant to Rule 4 — 1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Appellant signed the approved waiver of rights form and petitioned the circuit court for approval of the fee contract. Without holding a hearing and without making any factual findings, the circuit court denied the petition. This was error.
The rule provides that the trial court “shall” approve a petition “if the court determines the client has a complete understanding of the client’s rights and the terms of the proposed contract.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4 — 1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii). The comment to the rule also states that a trial court “must” approve the petition if the client understands the rights that are being waived and the contents of the contract. Comment to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5. “[T]he court must give unambiguous language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent.” R.T.G. Furniture Corp. v. Coates, 93 So.3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “Shall” is normally interpreted as a mandatory term that creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. City of St. Petersburg v. Remia, 41 So.3d 322, 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Psychiatric Inst. of *520 Delray, Inc. v. Keel, 717 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Consequently, the plain language of the rule required the trial court to approve the petition as long as it found that Appellant understood the rights that she was waiving and the terms of the fee contract. We, therefore, reverse the order on appeal and remand with directions for the trial court to make a determination as to whether Appellant’s waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
VAN NORTWICK, ROWE, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mahany v. Wright's Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., 194 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…s better reviewed as a petition for writ of certiorari because it alleges a harm that cannot be remedied in a plenary appeal and is not a partial final judgment as to the underlying cause of action in this .case. But see In re Buggs ex rel. Rengifo, 122 So. 3d 519, 520 (Fla. 1st, DCA 2013) (considering a similar order involving the Distasio Law Firm as a direct appeal, not as a petition for writ of certiorari). “We may grant a petition for cer-tiorari ‘only when the petitioner estabr lishes (1) a departure f…
Authorities Cited
- R.T.G. Furniture Corp. v. Coates, 93 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
- City OF ST. Petersburg & City of St. Petersburg Police Pension Bd. of Trs. v. Remia, 41 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
- Psychiatric Inst. OF Del-Ray, Inc. v. Keel, 717 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)