STEVEN JOSEPH KOPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Steven Joseph Kopson was convicted of seven counts including DUI manslaughter, DUI with serious bodily injury, and DWLS causing death arising from a drunk-driving incident that killed one pedestrian and injured another. The appellate court affirmed his convictions on four counts but reversed and remanded his convictions on three counts due to double jeopardy violations and remanded for resentencing because the trial court erroneously believed it lacked discretion to grant a downward departure.
The court held that counts I, IV, and VI must be vacated due to double jeopardy violations because a defendant cannot be convicted of both DUI manslaughter offenses for the same death, both DUI with serious bodily injury charges based on the same statutory language with different sentencing enhancements, or both DUI manslaughter and DWLS causing death for a single death. The court also held that the trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion to grant a downward departure, necessitating resentencing.
[1] A defendant cannot be convicted of both DUI manslaughter and DWLS causing death when a single death results from the same incident.
[2] A defendant cannot be convicted of DUI with serious bodily injury while impaired and DUI with serious bodily injury with an unlawful blood alcohol level under the same st…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it was fundamental error to adjudicate Kopson guilty on all counts”
Establishes that the trial court erred in convicting on multiple counts that violate double jeopardy protection
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKopson was driving with a suspended license while intoxicated (blood alcohol levels of .39 and .37) when he struck two pedestrians, killing one and in…
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The Appellant, Steven Joseph Kopson, was driving with a suspended license when he struck two pedestrians, killing one and causing serious bodily injury to the other, also hitting an unoccupied vehicle. Kop-son entered an open plea of guilty to seven counts, including DUI manslaughter with unlawful blood-alcohol level (UBAL) (count I), DUI manslaughter (impairment) (count II), DUI with serious bodily injury (count III), DUI with serious bodily injury (UBAL) (count IV), felony DUI based upon a fourth conviction (count V), DWLS causing death (count VI), and DUI with property damage (count VII). His blood alcohol levels were .39 and .37. Kopson had four prior DUIs stemming from three different criminal episodes. The trial court adjudicated Kopson guilty on all counts.
The trial court suspended sentences on counts I, IV, and VI on double jeopardy grounds; however, it was fundamental error to adjudicate Kopson guilty on all counts. See Ivey v. State, 47 So.3d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Count VI violates double jeopardy in relation to count II because a defendant cannot be convicted of both DUI manslaughter and DWLS causing death where there is only a single death; count IV violates double jeopardy in relation to count III because a defendant cannot be convicted of both DUI with serious bodily injury while impaired and DUI with serious bodily injury with an unlawful blood alcohol level under the same statute; and count I violates double jeopardy in relation to count II because a *171defendant cannot be convicted of DUI manslaughter twice for the same death. See State v. Cooper, 634 So.2d 1074, 1074-75 (Fla.1994). We direct the trial court on remand to vacate the adjudications on counts I, IV, and VI. Resentencing is also necessary as the trial court erroneously believed it did not have discretion to grant Kopson’s motion for a downward departure. See Colletta v. State, 126 So.3d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); State v. Chubbuck, 83 So.3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Ficklin v. State, 686 So.2d 708, 709-10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded for new sentencing hearing.
WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
On Motion for Rehearing
Appellant, in his motion for rehearing, requests that this court issue a ruling on certain arguments raised in his brief but not mentioned in our prior opinion. We grant appellant’s motion to clarify that we found no merit in the remaining issues presented in this appeal.
WARNER, POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
On Motion for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, in his motion for rehearing, requests that this court issue a ruling on certain arguments raised in his brief but not mentioned in our prior opinion. We grant appellant’s motion to clarify that we found no merit in the remaining issues presented in this appeal.
WARNER, POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Kopson v. State, 162 So. 3d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…oneous and applied the credit to only the first of the consecutive sentences. We affirm because the court can correct an erroneous award of jail credit in a new sentencing proceeding without violating double jeopardy principles. In Kopson v. State, 125 So. 3d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), we directed the trial court to vacate various counts on double jeopardy grounds. We remanded to the trial court to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, because in the original proceeding the trial court had erroneously beli…
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Kopson v. State, 199 So. 3d 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…lects that a 364-day sentence was imposed in count VII with credit for 1058 days of time served. First Appeal In Kopson’s direct appeal, we held that adjudicating Kopson guilty on all seven [*1072] counts violated double jeopardy. Kopson v. State, 125 So. 3d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (Kopson I). Therefore, we ordered the trial court to vacate the adjudications on the three counts in which it had originally suspended sentence. Id. at 171. In addition, we ordered resentencing on the ground that the trial c…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994)
- Ivey v. State, 47 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- State v. Chubbuck, 83 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
- Colletta v. State, 126 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
- Cosmos K. Ficklin. v. State, 686 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)