IN RE ESTATE OF ISAK STEIN, DECEASED. JACOB STEIN, EXECUTOR, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNA STEIN, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed a lower court's order granting a family allowance to a widow, holding that a prenuptial agreement does not bar such an allowance before its validity is determined and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion.
A prenuptial agreement does not bar a widow's allowance prior to a determination of its legal effect. The county judge has discretion to grant a family allowance, and this court will not disturb the order absent an abuse of discretion.
“Under the terms of section 733.20(d) and (i), supra, it is clear that the county judge is given the discretion to determine the necessity for an allowance to the widow or minor children, and in the absence of a showing of an abuse of the exercise of this discretion, this court will not disturb an order granting a family allowance.”
Establishes the standard of review for the granting of a family allowance, emphasizing the lower court's discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe executor of an estate appealed an order granting a family allowance to the widow. The executor argued there was no factual basis for the allowance…
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Appellant, executor of an estate, is appealing from an order of the County Judges’ Court for Dade County, which order granted a family allowance to the ap-pellee, widow of the deceased, pursuant to section 733.20(d), (i), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Appellant contends that there was no factual basis for granting the allowance. Under the terms of section 733.20(d) and (i), supra, it is clear that the county judge is given the discretion to determine the necessity for an allowance to the widow or minor children, and in the absence of a showing of an abuse of the exercise of this discretion, this court will not disturb an order granting a family allowance.
A review of the proceedings and testimony taken before the county judge indicates that there was sufficient evidence to support an order granting a widow’s allowance.
Appellant further contends that an antenuptial agreement entered into by the decedent and his widow, in which the latter waived any statutory interest in her husband’s estate and also waived her right to elect to take against her husband’s will, bars her right to a widow’s allowance. The widow denied the validity of the agreement in the proceedings before the county judge. The validity of this prenuptial agreement was not determined at the time of the hearing. We, therefore, hold that a prenuptial contract will not bar a widow’s allowance prior to a determination of its legal effect.
Affirmed.
HORTON, J., concurs.
CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., concurs specially.
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion prepared by Judge PEARSON, and I would add the ground that the family allowance, authorized to be paid for the support of the widow in limited amount and for a prescribed period, is a “claim against the estate” under the statute (§ 733.20, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.), and, therefore, not affected by the ante-nuptial agreement.
CARROLL, CHAS., Chief Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion prepared by Judge PEARSON, and I would add the ground that the family allowance, authorized to be paid for the support of the widow in limited amount and for a prescribed period, is a “claim against the estate” under the statute (§ 733.20, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.), and, therefore, not affected by the ante-nuptial agreement.
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In re Est. of Howard W. Reed v. Reed, 354 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978)…pose is aiding the needy spouse of a decedent while the decedent’s estate is in the often lengthy probate administration process. In re Sacks, 267 So. 2d 888 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Youngelson v. Youngelson, 114 So. 2d 642 (Fla.3d DCA 1959); In re Stein, 106 So. 2d 2 (Fla.3d DCA 1958). The purpose is legitimate, but there is no reasonable justification for providing for needy spouses of one sex but not the other. This case is different from In re Estate of Rincon, supra, and Shevin v. Kahn, supra, both relied u…
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Youngelson v. Est. of Max Youngelson, 114 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)…t against an estate granted by statute to a widow or dependent family where necessary to meet an emergency situation. Section 733.20(1) (d), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., In re Gilbert’s Estate, 160 Fla. 528, 36 So. 2d 213; In re Stein’s Estate, Fla.App. 1958, 106 So. 2d 2. Fur [*645] ther the allowance of such fund is within the sound discretion of the county judge. In re Stein’s Estate, supra. The order of the county judge denying the petition of the widow for an allowance from the estate is not shown to be an abuse…
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In re Est. of Merle F. Anderson v. Anderson, 149 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)…te-nuptial agreement may or may not be sufficient to bar a family allowance. It has been held, however, that an antenuptial agreement will not bar a widow’s allowance prior to a determination of its legal effect. In re Stein’s Estate, Fla.App. 1958, 106 So. 2d 2. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, Fla.App. 1962, 140 So. 2d 358, 360. Thus a reasonable allowance based on a clear showing of need may be justified in instances where the agreement is subjected to prompt litigation and that fact is brought promptly to the at…
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