SAGA BAY GARDENS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLANT,

v.

FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF BLANKET RECEIVER, APPELLEE

PER CURIAM.

Saga Bay Gardens Condominium Association (“the Association”) appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Israel Reyes (“the receiver’s attorney”). We reverse because the receiver’s attorney lacked standing to pursue the receiver’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs.1

In November 2011, Saga Bay Gardens Condominium had a number of units delinquent in assessments. As a result, the Association petitioned the trial court for the appointment of a receiver. The trial court granted the petition and appointed Enrique Garcia (“the receiver”).

In the order appointing the receiver, the trial court authorized him “[t]o employ attorneys to provide legal services for [him] for such purposes as may be necessary during the period of the receivership,” including any services related to a person or entity interfering with him in the performance of his duties. The order went on to state that “[s]hould the Receiver be required to engage the services of [his] attorney(s) for the enforcement of this Order, the Receiver shall [be] entitled to reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney(s) fees.”

In December 2011, a group of Saga Bay Gardens Condominium unit owners filed a motion to intervene and to vacate the order appointing the receiver, in which several allegations were made against the receiver. The receiver’s attorney responded to the motion, contending that the unit owners seeking to intervene lacked a sufficient interest in the case. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and discharged the receiver. The receiver incurred additional legal fees subsequent to his discharge that apparently related to his obligation under a new receivership order to cooperate with his replacement.

In March 2012, the receiver’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw from the case, which was granted. One month later, the receiver’s attorney moved for attorney’s fees and costs that had been incurred prior to — and subsequent to — the receiver’s dis*802charge. The trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed.

The receiver’s attorney lacked standing to pursue an award of attorney’s fees and costs independent of the receiver. See Cacho v. The Bank of New York Mellon, 124 So.3d 943, 945 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 25, 2013) (holding that an attorney who withdrew as counsel of record and failed to timely seek a charging lien lacked standing to pursue attorney’s fees on his behalf in a foreclosure suit); see also Fickle v. Adkins, 385 So.2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (“We are cognizant of the oft-stated proposition that the right to attorneys’ fees is derivative in nature ....”). Under the order appointing the receiver, the receiver-not an attorney-was entitled to seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs: “the Receiver shall [be] entitled to reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney(s) fees.” (emphasis added). Moreover, the record reflects that no other court order, such as an order that approved retaining the receiver’s attorney, permitted the receiver’s attorney to pursue an award of attorney’s fees and costs independent of the receiver.2 We therefore reverse and vacate the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the receiver’s attorney.