DONALD MCKEE, APPELLANT,

v.

ESTHER JACOBO, AS INTERIM SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE

CASANUEVA, Judge.

Donald McKee, an involuntarily committed sexually violent offender, is presently in the custody of appellee, Esther Jacobo, as Interim Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services (DCF). He is *858being held at the Florida Civil Commitment Center, which is operated by a private enterprise under the auspices of DCF. Having a myriad of complaints pertaining to both the quality and quantity of the rehabilitative services and treatment that the for-profit operator of the facility provides him and others similarly detained, he filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 394.9215, Florida Statutes (2011).1 The circuit court concluded that a habeas petition was not the proper vehicle for Mr. McKee to seek relief because he was not requesting release from confinement. Instead, the circuit court deemed his petition as one seeking a writ of mandamus and summarily denied it as not having a clear legal right to the relief requested. Mr. McKee appealed that summary denial. We reverse.

By the plain language of the statute in its title and elsewhere, a habeas petition is the proper method to seek the type of relief Mr. McKee sought. In Curry v. Hadi, 903 So.2d 242, 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), this court held:

[T]he trial court erred in its interpretation of section 394.9215 as a limitation on the general habeas corpus rights of detainees [and construing] section 394.9215 as an attempt by the legislature to limit the rights of ... detainees to invoke the writ of habeas corpus.... [W]e construe that statute to simply specify the procedural mechanism for detainees to use when challenging certain issues relating to their confinement.

See also Finfrock v. Fla. Civil Commitment Ctr., 28 So.3d 983, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reversing the trial court which dismissed the petition without a hearing because it was “facially insufficient in that [it] did not state a sufficient claim for relief’). It was therefore error for the circuit court to deem Mr. McKee’s petition as one seeking mandamus.

Having been properly filed as a petition for habeas, it must be reviewed for facial sufficiency. And although the circuit court did not reach this step, our review of the petition leads to a conclusion that the first of Mr. McKee’s allegations is facially sufficient so as to require a response from DCF.2 See § 394.9215(l)(b).3 Mr. McKee *859claims that the quality and quantity of rehabilitative services he has access to fall below constitutionally acceptable standards. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-18, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (holding that involuntarily committed persons retain their constitutionally protected liberty interest that requires the State to provide “minimally adequate” treatment in an effort to return them to society or to “ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint,” if they were so amenable).4

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order denying Mr. McKee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand with directions to the circuit court to require a response to the petition from DCF. Further proceedings shall be held in accordance with the procedures outlined in part V of chapter 394.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

SILBERMAN and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.