MARCUS W. HODGES, APPELLANT,
v.
LAURA A. HODGES, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part a final judgment. The court corrected the trial court's child support calculation, eliminated the life insurance requirement, and reversed the mandatory partition and sale order for the marital home.
The court affirmed that the child support calculation was erroneous and the correct amount is $140.65 per month. The court reversed the life insurance requirement as unsupported by sufficient factual findings and improper in amount and beneficiary designation. The court reversed the mandatory sale provision because the trial court lacked authority to order partition in the absence of a request by either party.
[1] Child support calculations must be based on net income, not gross income, in accordance with statutory guidelines.
[2] A trial court may not order a party to provide life insurance to secure a child support obligation without sufficient factual findings.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court erroneously ordered Appellant to procure insurance in an amount exceeding the obligation”
Establishes that even if life insurance were appropriate, the amount ordered was improper
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were involved in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court calculated child support based on gross income amounts and ordered …
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Appellant challenges several aspects of a final judgment in this dissolution of marriage case. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties agree that the trial court erred in calculating child support by basing the calculation on gross income amounts. Based on the child support guidelines worksheet attached to the final judgment, the correct amount of child support is $140.65 per month.
We agree with Appellant that the trial court erred in ordering him to provide life insurance to secure his child support obligation. First, the requirement is not supported by sufficient factual findings. Lay-eni v. Layeni, 843 So.2d 295, 300 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Second, the court erroneously ordered Appellant to procure insurance in an amount exceeding the obligation. Foster v. Foster, 83 So.3d 747, 748 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Finally, the court erroneously ordered Appellant to list Appellee as the beneficiary. Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023,1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
The final issue that we address is the trial court’s order directing the partition of the marital home. This was the only significant asset available for distribution. The trial court distributed it to Appellant with the proviso that Appellant must pay Appellee her equity in the home within six months, failing which the property must be sold. Appellant challenges the order to sell the property because neither party *191had requested partition. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 646 So.2d 297, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (trial court without authority to order partition of property in absence of plea by either party). Accordingly, we reverse the order to the extent that it requires sale of the property. On remand, the trial court may revisit the distribution scheme. Alternatively, Appellee may move to enforce the directive to pay Appel-lee’s equity, in which case the trial court may order the sale of the property as a mechanism to enforce that aspect of the order, if requested in a motion.
In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
TORPY, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur.
COHEN, J., concurs specially with opinion in which TORPY, C.J., concurs.
concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion and write only to suggest that, in niy view, a specific pleading for partition of the marital home should not be required for a trial court to dispose of that home. Given the equitable distribution statute, section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2013), and the fact that, in many cases, the marital home is the only asset of significant value, the requirement is outdated and unnecessary. See Riley v. Edwards-Riley, 963 So.2d 829, 830-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that the equitable distribution statute renders it “no longer necessary to seek partition as part of a dissolution action to divide or distribute a parcel of property owned by a husband and a wife,” and noting that section 61.075(4) “expressly provides that a final judgment of dissolution of marriage which distributes assets ‘shall have the effect of a duly executed instrument of conveyance, transfer, release, or acquisition’ ” (quoting § 61.075(4), Fla. Stat. (2005))). In situations where a trial court is likely to order the sale or other distribution of the marital home, the parties have been unable to resolve the issue of ownership of the homestead and accompanying debt and are in need of the trial court’s intervention. No one is surprised when the court does so as part of the equitable distribution scheme.
TORPY, C.J., concurs.
COHEN, J.,
concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion and write only to suggest that, in niy view, a specific pleading for partition of the marital home should not be required for a trial court to dispose of that home. Given the equitable distribution statute, section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2013), and the fact that, in many cases, the marital home is the only asset of significant value, the requirement is outdated and unnecessary. See Riley v. Edwards-Riley, 963 So. 2d 829, 830-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that the equitable distribution statute renders it “no longer necessary to seek partition as part of a dissolution action to divide or distribute a parcel of property owned by a husband and a wife,” and noting that section 61.075(4) “expressly provides that a final judgment of dissolution of marriage which distributes assets ‘shall have the effect of a duly executed instrument of conveyance, transfer, release, or acquisition’ ” (quoting § 61.075(4), Fla. Stat. (2005))). In situations where a trial court is likely to order the sale or other distribution of the marital home, the parties have been unable to resolve the issue of ownership of the homestead and accompanying debt and are in need of the trial court’s intervention. No one is surprised when the court does so as part of the equitable distribution scheme.
TORPY, C.J., concurs.
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Authorities Cited
- Layeni v. Kehinde A. Layeni, 843 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Foster v. Foster, 83 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
- Riley v. Una May Edwards-Riley, 963 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Watson v. Raymon O. Watson, 646 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- State v. Soukup, 646 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)