JOHNNIE FLOYD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Floyd challenged the denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion, claiming counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecution impeached him with his post-Miranda silence. The court affirmed most claims but reversed and remanded the ineffective assistance claim regarding the state's improper comments on his exercise of the right to remain silent.
The court held that counsel appeared deficient for failing to object to the state's questions regarding appellant's post-arrest silence, as these questions constituted improper comments on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent under state constitutional law.
[1] A prosecutor may not impeach a defendant with their post-arrest or post-Miranda silence.
[2] Comments on a defendant's exercise of their right to remain silent are prohibited if they can be construed by the jury as such, regardless of whether the comment is made…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendant's exercise of his or her right to remain silent, it violates the defendant's state constitutional right to silence, whether comment was introduced in state's case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes; holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his post-arrest or post-Miranda silence”
Establishes the controlling legal standard from State v. Hoggins that the prosecution cannot use post-Miranda silence for impeachment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFloyd was charged with a shooting and claimed self-defense at trial. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned why Floyd did not talk to pol…
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The appellant challenges the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the denial of all but one of the appellant’s claims. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand the denial of ground two to the extent the appellant asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the state impeached him with his post-Miranda1 silence.
In ground two, the appellant alleges that counsel failed to object when the state impeached him with his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. He alleges that the prosecutor asked him why he did not talk to the police or tell the police that he acted in self defense. Specifically, he believes counsel should have objected to the following line of questioning:
State: Okay. You told this jury that this Shooting was in self-defense. That’s what your attorney has asked you and that’s what your response was that you shot this man in self-defense?
Defendant: Yes.
State: Okay. Then why did you say no, you didn’t want to talk to the police.
State: Why not talk to the police if what you are saying is true.
Defendant: Because I could always talk to them.
State: You could? When?
Defendant: Whenever I got my lawyer.
*1215State: And did you do that?
Defendant: I got my lawyer.
State: Did you talk to the police?
Defendant: They never came and talked to me.
State: Oh, did you[r] attorney ever invite them to come talk to you and say, hey, we got a meeting?
Defendant: I mean, I figured it was probably too much — too late then.
State: Oh. So you didn’t really want to talk to the police?
Defendant: I mean, I never — it came up. That never — it was never in the conversation.
This line of questioning clearly constituted comments on the appellant’s right to remain silent. See State v. Hoggins, 718 So.2d 761 (Fla.1998) (holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent, it violates the defendant’s state constitutional right to silence, whether comment was introduced in state’s casein-chief or for impeachment purposes; holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his post-arrest or post-Miranda silence). Thus, it appears counsel may have been deficient for failing to object to the state’s questions regarding appellant’s post-arrest silence.2 As the appellant’s defense at trial was self-defense, the state’s highlighting of the fact that he exercised his right to remain silent and did not volunteer information could have been prejudicial. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to attach portions of the record refuting appellant’s allegations or to hold an evidentiary hearing.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part, with directions.
LEWIS, C.J., WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Moss v. State, 169 So. 3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…ts he offers at trial is improper. Chamblin v. State, 994 So. 2d 1165, 1167-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (reversing due to prosecutor’s comment that defendant, accused of DUI manslaughter, had “waited a year” to blame the victim); see also Floyd v. State, 129 So. 3d 1214, 1214-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (finding “clearly” improper a prosecutor’s questioning of the defendant as to why he did not speak to police before trial to tell them he acted in self-defense, as he claimed during his trial testimony). Under the circu…
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Chester v. State, 213 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…ent.) The State’s question was improper. See Moss v. State, 169 So. 3d 223, 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[A] comment by a prosecutor that the defendant has not before offered the explanation of events he offers at trial is improper.”); Floyd v. State, 129 So. 3d 1214, 1214-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that prosecutor’s questioning about why defendant did not earlier give self-defense theory to police “clearly constituted comments on the [defendantj’s right to remain silent”). Therefore, the trial court was co…
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Floyd v. State, 159 So. 3d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…PER CURIAM. This is the second appeal from denials of Johnnie Floyd’s motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In Floyd v. State, 129 So. 3d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), we reversed in part the denial of the motion, and directed the trial court to address on remand whether counsel’s performance was “deficient for failing to object to the state’s questions regarding appellant’s post-arrest…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2008)
- Harrel Franklin Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2012)
- State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1998)