STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,

v.

GEORGE ALTMAN, ALIAS GEORGIA BOY, AND JUDDIE TALBOT, APPELLEES

DREW, Justice.

The State has appealed from an order of the Circuit Court for Sumter County quashing count one of an information charging that appellee:

“did unlawfully have in [his] possession approximately 140 gallons of moonshine whiskey, being an alcoholic beverage' not made or manufactured in *402accordance with, or pursuant to the regulatory provisions of the laws of the State of Florida.”

The opinion of the court below1 was that it had no jurisdiction under this count because of the invalidity of the statute which *403purported to make the offense charged a felony which would be cognizable in that forum,2 and the appeal is made directly to this Court by reason of that finding.3

*404The applicable provisions of the law appear as Section 562.451, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.4

The contentions of appellee in attacking this statute are, in essence: that the controlling provision, sub-section 562.451(4), penalizes the possession of “moonshine whiskey” in a blanket fashion; that in subsection (2), of earlier origin, this term is used to refer to whisky in a certain state of manufacture without limitation to that of contraband character; that the words “moonshine whisky” must be interpreted uniformly throughout this section, and when this is done there results an obvious conflict between sub-section (2), which provides that possession of moonshine whisky shall be only of evidentiary significance, and sub-section (4), and also (3), which provide that possession of moonshine whisky shall be penalized as a substantive offense.

Appellee further contends that if this conflict is resolved by accepting the later legislative pronouncement5 in sub-section (4), then the act by which that section was incorporated in the law, Chapter 29964, Laws of Florida 1955, is invalid because its title did not indicate that the law was being altered in this respect;6 and that the re-enactment of this provision in compilation form, which is said to cure such defects,7 cannot operate to sustain the law because, if such legislative action is relied *405upon to correct a defect in the original enactment, then it would have to he construed as re-vivifying the entire section, including sub-section (2), resulting again in a statute which is conflicting within itself and, by the usual rule with respect to strict construction of criminal laws,8 unenforceable.

The State, by adopting the position on this appeal that sections (3) and (4) operated to repeal the earlier provisions, recognizes the existence of a conflict and appears to concede that in the Florida beverage law the term “moonshine whisky” is used in a broad sense to mean green or raw whisky in general, identifiable by a characteristic flavor or odor, without regard to the legality or illegality of its manufacture. The fact that this Court in an earlier decision took judicial cognizance that “that commodity known as moonshine whiskey is an alcoholic liquor manufactured without the protection of, and contrary to, law in respect to which no tax is either levied or may be collected” 9 cannot alter the controlling effect of the subsequent legislative usage of the term in a different sense when it incorporated such language in the statute.10 Certainly the definition in Brown v. State, note 9 supra, cannot be read into sub-section (2), as there could be no rational purpose or explanation for a legislative provision that possession of illicitly manufactured whisky should be “prima facie evidence that the same was not made or manufactured in accordance with” our law.11

From this analysis the conclusion is inescapable that Chapter 29964, supra, did more than provide a new penalty for a previously defined offense. Sub-section 562.451(1) had, of course, theretofore proscribed the possession of alcoholic beverage not “made or manufactured in accordance with the regulatory provisions of the laws of the state,” but the reasoning above demonstrates the necessity, under the terms of the companion provision simultaneously enacted, for giving the term “moonshine whisky” a broader connotation, i.e. subsection (2) obviously contemplated that one might under some circumstances possess moonshine whisky which was not illicit, otherwise possession of such would not be rebuttable evidence of possession of contraband.

The declarations in the title to Chapter 2996412 were very similar to those contained in the title to Chapter 23746, Laws of Florida, 1947,13 an earlier act amend*406ing the same section only by adding a subsection (3) to provide a specific penalty for “any person violating any provisions of this law,” where violations were formerly punishable only as misdemeanors under related provisions elsewhere in the law. Ths latter act, which did not in any way alter the existing provision (sub-section [2]) that possession of moonshine was merely prima facie evidence of an offense, nevertheless contained, among the enumerations of amendments to some twenty different sections of the beverage laws, a declaration that it was an act “Prohibiting the Possession of Moonshine Liquor; and Providing for Penalties for the Violation of the Beverage Law.” Chapter 29964, so far as here material, was entitled as an act simply “amending Subsection (3) of Section 562.451, Florida Statutes, and adding a new Subsection (4) thereto, providing for penalties for possession of mash, wort, wash or moonshine liquor

Even assuming that this might in other circumstances be adequate to encompass the enactment of new provisions such as sub-sections (3) and (4), supra, and assuming, but not deciding, that such a blanket prohibition, penalizing possession of a particular beverage whether or not illicitly produced, could properly be Included’in an act purportedly aimed at amending beverage tax laws,14 the title made no reference to its effect as altering sub-section (2) which was the only provision theretofore dealing specifically with moonshine-whisky, nor did it indicate that for the first time all moonshine was to be denominated' contraband, or that acts that were not previously punishable were to become so.. The constitutional inhibitions in this respect were disregarded, and it could not. be seriously argued that as a practical matter the title would put one on notice-of any such result.15

For the reasons above noted, the re-enactment of this provision in the process of statutory compilation does not bolster the appellant’s position and the trial court properly concluded that, under the-rules of construction applicable to penal' laws in general, section 562.451(4) is invalid, and the information predicated! thereon must fall.16

Affirmed.

TERRELL, C. J., and THORNAL andi O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS, J., dissents.