EMILY CHANCY WALKER, TRUSTEE OF THE THOMAS WALKER IRREVOCABLE TRUST, JOHN FLOYD WALKER, T.B. WALKER, JR., T. BUTLER WALKER, SR., A/K/A THOMAS BUTLER WALKER, SR., AND EMILY WALKER, A/K/A EMILY C. WALKER, APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORIDA GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ALAN BROWN WHITEHOUSE, ET AL., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Property owners appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to enforce a tree-replacement obligation contained in an order of taking. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the denial of the motion was a non-final order not subject to interlocutory appeal under Florida Appellate Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii).
The denial of the motion to enforce the tree-replacement obligation was a non-final and non-appealable order. Appellants failed to meet the requirements for interlocutory appeal because they sought enforcement of a contractual right to replacement of unspecified property rather than claiming a right to possession of identifiable property, and the trial court did not determine the immediate right to the replacement trees but instead postponed ruling by permitting Appellants to amend their answer.
[1] An order determining the right to immediate possession of property is appealable as a non-final order.
[2] Orders concerning the enforcement of contractual obligations, rather than the immediate possession of property, are generally not appealable as non-final orders.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The thrust of rule 9.130 is to restrict the number of appealable nonfinal orders.”
Establishes the narrow construction principle governing interlocutory appeals under Florida Rule 9.130
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants were property owners whose land was subject to an order of taking by Appellee, Florida Gas Transmission Company. The order of taking contai…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right To Immediate Possession Of Property cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellants, property owners, appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to enforce an order of taking. The court denied their motion to enforce a provision in the order of taking that required Appel-lee to replace, among other things, “trees, landscaping, grasses, shrubbery, [and] crops” (the tree-replacement obligation). Appellants claim the denial of the motion to enforce the tree-replacement obligation, contained within a schedule attached to the order of taking, was an order determining “the right to immediate possession of property.” They therefore assert the denial was appealable via Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). We disagree.
Our supreme court has “carefully created” each category of non-final order subject to interlocutory review after input and weighing various policy considerations, “such as increased appellate workload and concomitant delay in ... resolution.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, Inc., 104 So.3d 344, 348 (Fla.2012). Accordingly, the categories of non-final orders subject to interlocutory appeal are narrowly construed. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So.2d 959, 961 (Fla.1984) (“The thrust of rule 9.130 is to restrict the number of appealable nonfinal orders.”).
Here, quite simply, no trees/shrubs/grasses exist. Appellee clear cut them. Thus, instead of the right to immediate possession of the property (i.e., trees), Appellants seek enforcement of a contractual right to replacement of unspecified property. They do not claim a right to possession of identifiable property as required by Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). In ad*573dition, the trial court granted Appellants’ alternative request to amend their answer below to assert claims regarding the tree-replacement obligation. The trial court’s order leaves pending the replacement issue.1 Thus, the court has not determined the immediate right to the replacement trees/shrubs/grasses as it has simply postponed or deferred ruling. Appellants have not met the immediacy requirement under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). See Naghtin v. Jones, 680 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Accordingly, the order on appeal is non-final and non-appealable. This court does not have jurisdiction to review it. Appellants’ appeal is DISMISSED.
CLARK, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Florida Highway Patrol v. Lashonta Renea Jackson, 238 So. 3d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
-
Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Pozos, 242 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)
-
Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Calonge, 246 So. 3d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. SAN Perdido Ass'n, Inc., 104 So. 3d 344 (Fla. 2012)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1984)
- Burke Washington v. State, 680 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Naghtin v. Gadis Jones, 680 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)