RICHARD MORRIS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Morris sought rehearing of a denial of his successive petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court held that Morris failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or good cause for raising the claim in a second petition rather than the first, and therefore denied the motion for rehearing.
The court held that petitioner failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances and good cause required to permit a successive IAAC petition. A prisoner's recent discovery of an already existing case does not constitute extraordinary circumstances or good cause, and prisoners are not exempt from the rule prohibiting successive petitions.
[1] A successive petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may be dismissed if it does not allege new grounds and the prior determination was on the merit…
[2] Generally, only one motion for postconviction relief or petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is permitted.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The abuse of the procedure doctrine, as recently codified in rule 3.850, is now expanded to allow a court to summarily deny a successive motion for post-conviction relief unless the movant alleges that the asserted grounds were not known and could not have been known to the movant at the time the initial motion was filed.”
Establishes the standard for dismissing successive petitions and that the movant must show the grounds were unknown and unknowable at the time of the initial filing.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMorris filed a successive petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, claiming he was unaware of Mullins v. State regarding whether…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Successive Petitions cases and more on FLexlaw
On Motion for Rehearing
We previously denied petitioner’s successive petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC) by order citing Francois v. Wainwright, 470 So.2d 685, 686 (Fla.1985), and Xiques v. Dugger, 571 So.2d 3, 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Petitioner moves for rehearing, arguing that he was entitled to file a successive petition pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(6)(C) which provides:
The court may dismiss a second or successive petition if it does not allege new grounds and the prior determination was on the merits, or if a failure to assert the grounds was an abuse of procedure.
Petitioner asserts that his successive petition alleged a new ground and was not an abuse of procedure. Petitioner shows no extraordinary circumstances that prohibited him from raising the issue in the first petition, and we deny the motion for rehearing.
It is well recognized that generally only one Rule 3.850 motion or IAAC petition is allowed. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Fla.2004); Christopher v. State, 489 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla.1986); see also Jackman v. State, 88 So.3d 325, 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (en banc).
Rule 9.141(d)(6)(C) treats successive IAAC petitions similarly to successive Rule 3.850 motions for postconviction relief. Rule 3.850(h) limits movants to one Rule 3.850 motion unless extraordinary circumstances are shown. A court may dismiss a successive motion that raises new grounds if there is no good cause for the failure to have raised the grounds in the prior motion. Id. The Florida Supreme Court long ago observed:
The abuse of the procedure doctrine, as recently codified in rule 3.850, is now expanded to allow a court to summarily deny a successive motion for post-conviction relief unless the movant alleges that the asserted grounds were not known and could not have been known to the movant at the time the initial motion was filed. Further, the movant must show justification for the failure to raise the asserted issues in the first motion.
Christopher, 489 So.2d at 24 (citations omitted). The burden is on the movant to *1068show extraordinary circumstances and good cause for having failed to raise the “new” claim in the prior motion.
The same principles are stated in Francois and Xiques with respect to petitions alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Courts routinely deny successive petitions under Xiques and the rule. E.g. Hernandez v. State, 990 So.2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Marzullo v. State, 908 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The authority to allow a successive IAAC petition is discretionary, not mandatory. The burden is on the petitioner to show extraordinary circumstances and good cause for the failure to have raised the issue in the prior petition.
Here, petitioner alleged that when he filed his prior petition, he was not aware of Mullins v. State, 766 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), regarding whether it is eiTor to allow witnesses to testify in prison clothing. The motion for rehearing refers to petitioner’s lack of education, and the limited abilities of prisoners to conduct legal research from within the prison system. The discovery of a case does not excuse the failure to have raised the issue in his first petition.
We are not unsympathetic to the plight of inmates attempting to conduct legal research from prison, but a prisoner’s recent discovery of an already existing case simply does not constitute extraordinary circumstances or good cause. To permit a successive motion/petition in this situation would be inconsistent with the intent of the rule and the general principles underlying the abuse of procedure doctrine. Generally, only one postconviction motion or petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is allowed. Mullins issued more than a decade before petitioner filed his first petition. Petitioner’s recent discovery of this case is not good cause to permit a successive petition. Prisoners are not exempt from the rule prohibiting successive petitions.
Motion for rehearing denied.
WARNER, TAYLOR and CONNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Koons v. State, 165 So. 3d 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…ant to allege grounds that are new and different than those raised in the previous motion and justify his or her failure to raise the asserted grounds in the previous 3.850 motion. Christopher v. State, 489 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla.1986); Morris v. State, 134 So. 3d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c)(5) (“The motion must also include an explanation of ... the reason or reasons the claim or claims in the present motion were not raised in the former motion or motions.”). The movant m…
-
Vincente Carbajal v. State, 148 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…the files and records necessary to support the court’s ruling.” Id. We recognize that “[t]he burden is on the movant to show extraordinary circumstances and good cause for having failed to raise the ‘new* claim in the prior motion.” Morris v. State, 134 So. 3d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). But if a movant’s allegations are facially insufficient in this regard, the postconviction court may not simply deny or dismiss the motion. Instead, the court must afford the movant an opportunity to correct the deficie…
-
Ladon M. Green v. State, 187 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…PER CURIAM. The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is dismissed as successive. See Morris v. State, 134 So. 3d 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). WETHERELL, RAY, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004)
- Tortoise Island Cmtys., Inc. v. The Moorings Ass'n, Inc., 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1986)
- Francois v. Louie L. Wainwright, 470 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1985)
- Jackman v. State, 88 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
- Xiques v. Dugger, 571 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Tylo Mullins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Hernandez v. State, 990 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Crawford v. State, 908 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Benny N. Marzullo v. State, 908 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)