DEVEN COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cooper challenges his convictions for lewd or lascivious battery and molestation, arguing the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of the victim regarding her prior sexual experiences under Florida's Rape Shield Statute. Although the state concedes the statute does not apply to these offenses, the court affirms because the defendant failed to preserve the issue by not arguing the statute's categorical inapplicability at trial.
The appellate court affirms the trial court's exclusion of the testimony because the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Although the state concedes the Rape Shield Statute does not apply to prosecutions for lewd or lascivious molestation and battery, the defendant failed to argue this categorical inapplicability at trial and thus cannot raise it on appeal.
[1] A contention on appeal that a statute does not apply to a particular offense is not preserved if the defense below argued only that the statute should not be interpreted…
[2] For an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as the legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”
Establishes the preservation of issues doctrine requiring that specific legal grounds for objections must be raised at trial to be reviewable on appeal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCooper was convicted of lewd or lascivious battery and molestation. The trial court granted the state's motion in limine preventing cross-examination …
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Appellant challenges his convictions for lewd or lascivious battery and molestation by contending that the trial court erred in restricting his cross-examination of the victim regarding her prior sexual experiences and her denial of any prior sexual experience to a police officer investigating this case. The court granted the state’s motion in limine to prevent such cross-examination based upon section 794.022, Florida Statutes (2008) (commonly referred to as the “Rape Shield Statute”). The state concedes that the court erred in excluding it on this ground, as the statute does not apply to prosecutions for lewd or lascivious molestation and battery. See § 794.022(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2008) (referring, only to prosecutions under section 794.011, the sexual battery statute); Lewis v. State, 591 So.2d 922, 924-25 n. 4-5 (Fla.1991). But the state takes issue with appellant’s contention that he was entitled to cross-examine her on these subjects, contending that they were irrelevant or improper character evidence. We affirm because the issue has not been preserved.
In the trial court, the defense did not argue that the Rape Shield Statute was inapplicable to this type of offense. Both parties and the court assumed that the statute applied. The defense argued that the statute should not be interpreted to exclude the specific testimony he sought to elicit.1 This is not sufficient to preserve the argument he raises on appeal: that the statute categorically does not apply to these offenses. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So.3d 1105, 1108 (Fla.2010) (“[F]or an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”) (quoting Harrell v. State, 894 So.2d 935, 940 (Fla.2005)); McGee v. State, 19 So.3d 1074, 1079 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Any specific reason for reversal must be a specific reason that was advanced by the appellant in the trial court.”) (quoting I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). The exclusion of this testimony also does not rise to the level of fundamental error. See Anderson v. State, 841 So.2d 390, 403 (Fla.2003) (defining fundamental error as “error that *532reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error”).2
As to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that no ineffective assistance is apparent on the face of the appellate record. See Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 642 (Fla.2000); Hills v. State, 78 So.3d 648, 652-53 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Our affirmance is thus without prejudice to appellant raising this issue in a postconviction motion.
WARNER, FORST and KLINGENSMITH, JJ„ concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Cooper v. State (S.D. Fla. 2021)…that the state trial court erred when it granted the state’s motion in limine to limit cross-examination of the victim pursuant to the Rape Shield Law because that law does not apply to prosecutions for lewd or lascivious battery. Cooper v. State, 137 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Petitioner alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to know the law and raise a meritorious issue. Id. at 21–22. Petitioner alleged that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance because it prevented counsel…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2000)
- Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2005)
- Aills v. Luciano Boemi, M.D., 29 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 2010)
- Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2003)
- Chapman v. State, 968 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1991)
- McGEE v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
- Mells v. State, 78 So. 3d 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)
- Hills v. State, 78 So. 3d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)