RICARDO E. WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2014-05-02
No. 2D13-1118
CASANUEVA and VILLANTI, JJ„ Concur.
137 So. 3d 594 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2014) Positive Treatment
Cited by 15 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Ricardo Walker appealed his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional based on a recent First District decision. The Second District affirmed, finding the cited case inapplicable because Walker possessed a modern firearm, not an antique or replica firearm.


Holding

The court affirmed Walker's conviction, holding that the felon in possession of a firearm statute is not facially unconstitutional. The Weeks decision, which addressed unconstitutionality as applied to antique or replica firearms, was inapplicable because Walker possessed a modern weapon.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's failure to appear for sentencing in violation of a plea agreement permits the trial court to impose the maximum prison term for the offenses.

[2] The felon in possession of a firearm statute is not facially unconstitutional.

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Key Quotes

“As we read Weeks, the First District seemingly found the statute unconstitutional as applied— i.e., to antique or replica firearms as further defined in section 790.001(1), and (6).”

Establishes the court's interpretation that Weeks involved unconstitutionality as applied rather than facial unconstitutionality.

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Facts & Procedural History

Ricardo Walker entered guilty pleas to possession of cannabis (third-degree felony) and felon in possession of a firearm (second-degree felony) in exc…

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Opinion of the Court
LaROSE, Judge.

LaROSE, Judge.

Ricardo Walker entered guilty pleas, in exchange for a limited prison term, to possession of cannabis in an amount greater than twenty grams, a third-degree felony, and felon in possession of a firearm, a second-degree felony.. See §§ 893.13(6)(a), 790.23(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (2011). His plea agreement required Mr. Walker to appear timely for sentencing. When he failed to do so, the trial court imposed the maximum prison term for each offense. See Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Fla.1988); Norman v. State, 43 So.3d 771, 773-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In an amended initial brief, Mr. Walker argues that his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm constitutes fundamental error.1

Mr. Walker argues that Weeks v. State, — So.3d —, 2013 WL 6818369, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D35 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 26, 2013), compels the conclusion that the felon in possession statute is facially unconstitutional. We disagree. As we read Weeks, the First District seemingly found the statute unconstitutional as applied— i.e., to antique or replica firearms as further defined in section 790.001(1), and (6). In Weeks, the firearm was a black powder muzzle loader rifle with a percussion cap firing system of ancient vintage, arguably a replica of an antique, with an added scope. Id. at-, at D36. Following the denial of a motion to dismiss, Weeks entered a no contest plea, reserving the right to appeal the dispositive motion. Weeks certified conflict with Bostic v. State, 902 So.2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (holding that the felon in possession of a firearm statute is not unconstitutional because the term “replica” is not so vague as to render the statute unconstitutional). We note that the dissenting opinion in Bostic viewed the felon in possession statute unconstitutionally vague as applied. Bostic, 902 So.2d at 229 (Sharp, W., J., dissenting).

Nothing in our record suggests that Mr. Walker possessed an antique or replica firearm. Indeed, the record shows that he possessed a modern weapon, a Ruger firearm with rounds of ammunition in the magazine. Weeks and Bostic are inapplicable and are of no aid to Mr. Walker.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA and VILLANTI, JJ„ Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Kraay v. State, 148 So. 3d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …he original opinion in] Weeks appears to arise only in cases involving firearms that arguably might be regarded as a replica of an antique firearm, the issue does not result in the facial unconstitutionality of section 790.23(1).”); Walker v. State, 137 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("As we read [the original opinion in] Weeks, the First District seemingly found the statute unconstitutional as applied — i.e., to antique or replica firearms.... ”).…
  • Sexton v. State, 146 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
    …earm’ as elsewhere defined does not give adequate notice of what type of firearm may be lawfully carried by a convicted felon and, because of the imprecision, may invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at D36-D37. In Walker v. State, 137 So. 3d 594, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), we explained that in Weeks the First District had “seemingly found” that the relevant statute was unconstitutional as applied. That explanation appears sound because the decision in Weeks was based on that court’s conclusion…
  • Harrell v. State, 150 So. 3d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
    …d therein. We reject this constitutionality challenge because the evidence established that Harrell possessed a modern firearm, as opposed to an antique or replica firearm. See K.C. v. State, 147' So. 3d 552, 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Walker v. State, 137 So. 3d 594, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). II. Motion to Dismiss Under the Stand Your Ground Law In his motion to dismiss, Harrell argued that he was entitled to immunity from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground law as codified in sections 776.032 and 776.013(3…

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