ROBERT S. KUNKEL, APPELLANT,
v.
BRANDI STANFORD, ON BEHALF OF C.S., A MINOR CHILD, APPELLEE
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Appellant challenges an injunction for protection against domestic violence entered on behalf of his minor granddaughter. The court reverses, finding insufficient evidence that the granddaughter was either a victim of domestic violence or in imminent danger of becoming one, and that the trial court improperly granted the injunction based on the mother's preference to keep appellant away rather than statutory requirements.
Reversed and remanded. The evidence was insufficient to support the injunction because C.S. was neither a victim of domestic violence nor shown to have reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of becoming one, and the trial court improperly based the injunction on the mother's desire to exclude appellant rather than the statutory standard.
[1] An injunction for protection against domestic violence requires competent substantial evidence to support its entry.
[2] A domestic violence injunction may be entered if a person is the victim of domestic violence or has reasonable cause to believe they are in imminent danger of becoming th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An injunction for protection against domestic violence is reviewed for competent substantial evidence.”
Establishes the standard of review applicable to domestic violence injunctions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant's former wife testified that appellant attempted to gain entry to the gated community where his granddaughter C.S. lives. C.S. became upset …
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Appellant appeals an injunction for protection against domestic violence entered against him on behalf of his granddaughter, C.S. We reverse because the evidence was insufficient to support entry of the injunction.
During a hearing, appellant’s former wife testified that appellant tried to gain entry into the gated community where C.S. lives. She also testified to an incident where C.S. became upset upon seeing appellant in the waiting room at a doctor’s office. C.S.’s mother testified that C.S. cries hysterically in appellant’s presence. The mother explained that they used to live with appellant, and C.S. had seen appellant commit “verbal violence” on multiple occasions. She alleged that appellant is “not well” and refuses to get psychiatric help. The court ultimately granted the injunction, which remained effective until October 13,2013.
An injunction for protection against domestic violence is reviewed for competent substantial evidence. See Stone v. Stone, 128 So.3d 239, 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So.3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). A domestic violence injunction may be entered in favor of a person who is “either the victim of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or [who] has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” § 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). C.S. was not the victim of any act of domestic violence, and the record does not support a finding that C.S. had reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of becoming the victim of an act of domestic violence. Nor did the trial court make any such finding. Rather, it appears the trial court granted the injunction to support the decision of C.S.’s mother to keep appellant away from C.S. This is not the appropriate standard for granting a domestic violence injunction.
Although the injunction has expired, we reverse and remand “with instructions to vacate the injunction due to the collateral consequences such an injunction might cause.” Stone, 128 So.3d at 242.
Reversed and remanded.
WARNER, MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
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Mitchell v. Mitchell, 198 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…ts, angry messages, vague actions, and general conditional future threats without overt action implying imminence have been found to be insufficient. See Horowitz v. Horowitz, 160 So. 3d 530, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Kunkel v. Stanford ex. rel. C.S., 137 So. 3d 608, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Weisberg v. Albert, 123 So. 3d 663, 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Malchan v. Howard, 29 So. 3d 453, 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Oettmeier, 960 So. 2d at 903. Put generally, “uncivil behavior” and actions that “paint[] ... a typical…
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Regalado Lopez v. Regalado, 257 So. 3d 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
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Bell v. Battaglia, 332 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
- Stone v. Stone, 128 So. 3d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)