BRIAN WILKS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
KASEY L. CRONIN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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A former husband appealed a trial court order dismissing his motion to modify the parenting plan to increase his time-sharing with their child following his shift change from night to day shift. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory requirements for modification and lacked competent evidence to support its conclusion that there was no substantial change in circumstances.
The trial court erred in dismissing the modification motion because there was no competent, substantial evidence supporting its conclusion that there was no substantial change in circumstances, and the court failed to consider all required statutory elements including whether the change was material and whether modification was in the child's best interest. The involuntariness of the change is not a statutory requirement.
[1] A modification of a time-sharing provision in a parenting plan requires a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and must be in the best interes…
[2] A trial court's determination that there has been no substantial change of circumstances must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to modify the time-sharing provisions of a parenting plan, sections 61.13(2)(c) and (3) require that the modification be in the best interest of the child and be based upon a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances.”
Establishes the legal standard for modifying parenting plans under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrian Wilks and his former wife, both police officers, had an approved parenting plan. At the time the plan was established, Wilks worked the night sh…
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The former husband, Brian Wilks, appeals the Order Granting Former Wife’s Motion To Dismiss rendered following an evidentiary hearing.1 The Order is directed to Wilks’ motion to modify the parties’ parenting plan, particularly his request to modify the time-sharing component regarding their young child. Because there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that there was no substantial change of circumstances, and because the trial court failed to consider all of the elements of sections 61.13(2)(c) and (3), Florida Statutes (2013), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.2
Wilks and the former wife are both police officers. Wilks worked the night shift at the time the parenting plan was agreed to by the parties and approved by the court. Wilks’ change to the day shift gave Wilks the ability to be available to the child in a more significant way, leading Wilks to file his modification request to increase his share of time with the child. The former wife opposed the request.
In order to modify the time-sharing provisions of a parenting plan, sections 61.13(2)(c) and (3) require that the modification be in the best interest of the child and be based upon a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances. The trial court determined that the requested modification was not based on a substantial change of circumstances, but there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record to support that conclusion. In addition, the trial court held that the shift change was voluntary, but involuntariness of the change is not a requirement under the statute; consequently, the trial court erred in basing its decision on that finding. Furthermore, the trial court never considered the best interest of the child or whether the change was material, as required by the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand this case to the trial court for a hearing to determine the statutory requirements under sections 61.13(2)(c) and (3).
REVERSED; and REMANDED.
TORPY, C.J., SAWAYA, and BERGER, JJ., concur.