JEREMY STRONG, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Jeremy Strong petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to file a motion challenging sentencing fees. The court granted the petition in part, finding that the trial court imposed fees under repealed statutes without proper notice and opportunity to contest, requiring remand for re-imposition of fees with correct statutory authority.
The court granted the petition in part, striking all imposed fees and costs and remanding for the trial court to re-impose them with proper statutory citation and following correct procedure, including notice to the defendant of his right to contest discretionary fees.
[1] A trial court must provide a statutory basis for every cost imposed.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by imposing fees under repealed or renumbered statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court must provide a statutory basis for every cost imposed.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that sentencing fees must cite correct statutory authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStrong was sentenced in November 2009 to fifteen years in prison after pleading nolo contendere to possession of a firearm by a felon under a plea agr…
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Jeremy Strong raises four claims, of which only the first has merit, in his We deny the petition as to claims two, three, and four without discussion. In his first claim, Strong argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to challenge his fees because the trial court imposed fees under repealed and renumbered statutes and because Strong was not informed of his right to challenge the discretionary public defender fee. We agree, grant the petition in part, and remand for the lower court to strike the fees and public defender fee without prejudice for the court to re-impose the fees after following the correct procedure.
In November 2009, Strong was sentenced to fifteen years in prison after pleading nolo contendere to possession of a firearm by a felon, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. In the plea agreement, Strong agreed to pay fines and costs, but the agreement did not delineate specific fees or amounts. At sentencing, the trial court pronounced Strong’s sentence by stating:
Be a two hundred and fifty dollar fine, plus costs assessed by the Clerk’s Office, made a lien of record. Hundred dollars cost of prosecution,- made a lien of record. Fifty dollars a day, cost of incarceration, made a lien of record. Seven hundred and fifty dollars for the Public Defender made a lien of record.
On the form used to delineate Strong’s fees, many of the listed charges either fail to cite to statutory authority or cite to either incorrect, renumbered, or repealed statutory provisions. We strike the court’s imposition of fees and costs and remand for the trial court to cite the correct statutory authority. See Harrison v. State, — So.3d -, -, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D381, 2014 WL 594352, *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 17, 2014) (striking a fee for cost of prosecution and remanding for the court to cite statutory authority); V.D. v. State, 922 So.2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“A trial court must provide a statutory basis for every cost imposed.”).
Furthermore, “[w]hile statutorily-mandated costs may be imposed without notice (and thus, need not be individually announced at sentencing), discretionary costs or fines must be orally pronounced at sentencing in order to comport with due process requirements.” Boyington v. State, 125 So.3d 327, 327-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (citations omitted). The trial court must also advise the defendant of his right to contest the discretionary fee when it is orally imposed. Kirkland v. State, 106 So.3d 4, 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“[T]he Public Defender fee should be struck because the trial court did not advise Appellant of his right to contest the fee when it *682was orally imposed.” (citing § 938.29(5), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.720(d)(1))).
Petition GRANTED in part; REMANDED with instructions.
PALMER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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RAE v. State, 152 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…t and sentences except for the $500 public defender lien which was imposed by the trial [*95] court without providing notice to Rae of his right to contest the lien, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). See Strong v. State, 140 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that a public defender lien must be orally pronounced at sentencing and the trial court must advise the defendant of his right to contest same). Accordingly, we reverse the public defender lien without prejudice to the t…
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Lake v. State, 159 So. 3d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…reverse the $750 public defender fees imposed in each of the four cases because the fees were imposed without providing Appellant notice of her right to contest the fees as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). Strong v. State, 140 So. 3d 680, 681-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“The trial court must also advise the defendant of his right to contest the [public defender] fee when it is orally imposed.” (citing Kirkland v. State, 106 So. 3d 4, 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))). Our reversal of the public d…
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Haar v. State, 295 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)…e or alter definition of criminal conduct). Pursuant to the 2019 version of section 938.29, the trial court was not required to orally pronounce the $100 indigent defense cost prior to imposing it because the cost was mandatory. See Strong v. State, 140 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“[S]tatutorily-mandated costs may be imposed without notice (and thus, need not be individually announced at sentencing) . . . .” (quoting Boyington v. State, 125 So. 3d 327, 327–28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))). However, the State…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leondray Kirkland v. State, 106 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
- Vales v. State of Fla. & Wilton Manors Police Dep't, 922 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Boyington v. State, 125 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
- Mobley v. State, 125 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)