KAHEU LUCES, APPELLANT,
v.
RED VENTURES AND THE HARTFORD, APPELLEES
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In this workers' compensation appeal, the court affirmed the judge of compensation claims' (JCC) disapproval of a settlement stipulation's $1,500 attorney's fee as not qualifying under the medical-benefits-only provision of Florida's workers' compensation statute, but reversed the JCC's authority to unilaterally reform the settlement by redirecting the fee from counsel to the employee.
The court affirmed the JCC's disapproval of the $1,500 fee under section 440.34(3)(a) because counsel did not secure only medical benefits. However, the court reversed the JCC's reformation of the stipulation, holding that JCCs lack authority to reform agreements on their own motion and must remand for the parties to petition for attorney's fees approval under the appropriate statutory provision.
[1] A workers' compensation judge of compensation claims (JCC) cannot reform the agreements of parties on their own motion.
[2] A JCC is not a court of general jurisdiction and cannot reform contracts or effect a remedy not provided under the Workers' Compensation Law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A JCC is not a court of general jurisdiction, and cannot reform contracts or effect a remedy not provided under the Workers' Compensation Law.”
Establishes the limited authority of judges of compensation claims and prohibits them from reforming settlement agreements outside statutory authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant and the Employer/Carrier entered into a settlement stipulation that included $1,500 in attorney's fees payable by the Employer/Carrier to Cla…
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Claimant makes two arguments in this workers’ compensation appeal, one of which calls for reversing the order in part. We affirm the order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) insofar as it disapproved the parties’ settlement stipulation regarding $1,500 in attorney’s fees payable by the Employer/Carrier, purportedly authorized by section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 440.34(3)(a) provides for the award of an attorney’s fee from an employer “[ajgainst whom [a claimant] successfully asserts a petition for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file at such time a claim for disability, permanent impairment, wage-loss, or death benefits, arising out of the same accident.” (Emphasis added). The JCC ruled that counsel did not secure only (or perhaps any) medical benefits for Claimant, so that, inter alia, the caps in section 440.34(1) apply, not the “alternative attorney’s fee” (of up to $1,500) applicable where an attorney’s fee is owed on a medical benefits-only theory per paragraph (3)(a). § 440.34(7), Fla. Stat. (2009). The JCC invited counsel for the parties to seek a telephonic hearing and provide additional evidence supporting *1000the alleged medical benefit only claim. But Claimant’s counsel filed only a motion for rehearing that again lacked a meaningful legal or factual basis for approving a medical benefits only attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3)(a).
The JCC’s order did err, however, by reforming the parties’ settlement stipulation and remitting the $1,500 fee to the employee contrary to any apparent intention or agreement of the parties. As Claimant argues, chapter 440 limits the authority of JCCs and does not authorize them to reform the agreements of parties on their own motion. See Bend v. Shamrock Servs., 59 So.3d 153, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“A JCC is not a court of general jurisdiction, and cannot reform contracts or effect a remedy not provided under the Workers’ Compensation Law.”). The JCC was without authority to redirect the attorney’s fee from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction. On remand, the parties may petition for the approval of attorney’s fees payable to Claimant’s counsel under section 440.34(3)(b) — not paragraph (3)(a), for the reasons described above — -in discharge of any obligation that the Employer/Carrier may have to Claimant’s counsel for attorney’s fees.
Finally, the $500 amount in the parties’ agreement designated as “out of pocket costs” payable by the Employer/Carrier to Claimant (not her attorney) was not subject to the JCC’s approval at all. This amount was, by all appearances, a negotiated payment to be made to Claimant herself, not an attorney’s fee subject to the JCC’s approval under chapter 440.
Accordingly, we REVERSE IN PART the order on appeal insofar as it reforms the stipulation with respect to the $1500 attorney’s fee, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BENTON, SWANSON, and OSTERHAUS, JJ. concur.
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Yeimis Banegas v. ACR Env't, Inc., 228 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…ause the record here contains no evidence to rebut Claimant’s counsel’s sworn affidavit or the representations of the Employer/Carrier’s counsel, the JCC erred in reducing the time entries contained within that affidavit. In Luces v. Red Ventures, 140 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), we explained that “chapter 440 limits the authority of JCCs and does not authorize them to reform the agreements of the parties on their own motion.” Id. at 1000. Further, a JCC is “without authority to redirect the attorney’s f…
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Delgado v. City Concrete Sys., Inc., 220 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…ourt having jurisdiction over such proceedings.” § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. Thus, the JCC here had both the authority and the obligation to review the attorney fee stipulation and to approve or disapprove the agreed-upon fee. See Luces v. Red Ventures, 140 So. 3d 999, 999-1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (affirming JCC’s disapproval of stipulated attorney’s fee based on JCC’s finding that evidence did not support purported statutory basis for fee, but reversing JCC’s award of disapproved fee amount directly to claimant…
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Gomez v. Frank Crum, Inc., 228 So. 3d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…As for the redirection of the monies in excess of the statutory fee schedule to Claimant, a JCC is “without authority to redirect the attorney’s fee from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction.” Luces v. Red Ventures, 140 So. 3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining that “chapter =440' limits- the authority of JCCs and does not authorize them to reform the agreements of the parties on their own motion”). Thus, the JCC erred in doing so. Accordingly, we REVERSE the portion…
Authorities Cited
- Bend v. Shamrock Servs. & Zenith Ins. Co., 59 So. 3d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)