WILLIAM NATHANIEL TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Trial court reversibly erred by denying defendant's unequivocal assertion of right to self-representation and forcing appointed counsel upon him, despite finding a valid waiver of counsel; structural error requires reversal and new trial.
A trial court must permit a defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel and unequivocally asserted the right to self-representation to proceed pro se, with standby counsel available if needed.
[1] A trial court must honor a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel and unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, with standby counsel availab…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After Faretta, it is clear that the trial court may appoint 'standby counsel' for a defendant who successfully asserts his right to represent himself at trial.”
Court citing Behr v. Bell for the proposition that standby counsel is permissible and does not violate the right to self-representation.
William Nathaniel Taylor was charged with aggravated battery and resisting arrest without violence. The trial court found that Taylor had knowingly an…
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William Nathaniel Taylor appeals his convictions and sentences for aggravated battery and resisting arrest without violence. Taylor argues the trial court reversibly erred when, believing it could not appoint standby counsel, it forced him to be represented at trial by appointed counsel despite finding he had knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel and had unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation. We agree, and the State properly concedes that the trial court erred. See Behr v. Bell, 646 So.2d 837, 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“After Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ], it is clear that the trial court may appoint ‘standby counsel’ for a defendant who successfully asserts his right to represent himself at trial.”); see also McKenzie v. State, 29 So.3d 272, 284 (Fla.2010) (observing that standby counsel can help defendant “overcome procedural or evidentiary obstacles” without infringing on defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation). Because the error in not allowing Taylor to defend himself is structural and not subject to harmless error review, see Neal v. State, 132 So.3d 949, 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), we reverse and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
VAN NORTWICK, PADOVANO and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
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Taylor v. State, 145 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…[*1005] PER CURIAM. Pursuant to our recent decision in Taylor v. State, 140 So. 3d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the conviction for which the appellant was sentenced to probation was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence being appealed herein, which was imposed upon revocation of probation…
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- McKENZIE v. State, 29 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 2010)
- Neal v. State, 132 So. 3d 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
- Behr v. Bell, 646 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)