JACOB ALEXANDER WILKERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2014-07-25
No. 5D12-2023
TORPY, C.J., and EVANDER, J., concur.
143 So. 3d 462 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2014) Negative Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Wilkerson appeals his conviction and life sentence for lewd or lascivious battery on a fourteen-year-old child. The court affirms the conviction but reverses the life sentence, holding that under Florida's dangerous sexual felony offender statute, the mandatory minimum of twenty-five years—not life—is the only lawful sentence when that minimum exceeds the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.


Holding

The life sentence was unauthorized and must be corrected. When the mandatory minimum under section 794.0115(6) (twenty-five years) exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under section 775.082 (fifteen years for a second-degree felony), the mandatory minimum term must be imposed, not a life sentence.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's interpretation of sentencing statutes is reviewed de novo.

[2] Legislative intent, as determined by statutory language, guides statutory interpretation.

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Key Quotes

“If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section must be imposed.”

This statutory provision from section 794.0115(6) is dispositive: when the mandatory minimum under the dangerous sexual felony offender statute exceeds the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, only the mandatory minimum can be imposed.

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Facts & Procedural History

Wilkerson was convicted of lewd or lascivious battery on a fourteen-year-old child under section 800.04(4)(b), a second-degree felony punishable by up…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, J.

ORFINGER, J.

Jacob A. Wilkerson appeals his conviction and sentence for lewd or lascivious battery on a fourteen-year-old child. Wilkerson raises several issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. Following his conviction, Wilkerson was classified a dangerous sexual felony offender pursuant to section 794.0115(2), Florida Statutes (2012). While he does not challenge that designation, he contends his life sentence, with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years imprisonment, is illegal.1 We agree and reverse for resentenc-ing.

We review the trial court’s interpretation of sentencing statutes de novo. E.g., Paul v. State, 129 So.3d 1058, 1061 (Fla.2013). Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory interpretation. Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003). To discern legislative intent, courts look to the statute’s language since the statute’s text primarily determines legislative intent. Anderson v. State, 87 So.3d 774, 777 (Fla.2012); State v. D.C., 114 So.3d 440, 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

*463The purpose of section 794.0115 is to provide enhanced sentences for repeat sex offenders such as Wilkerson. Felder v. State, 116 So.3d 605, 606 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); State v. Mason, 979 So.2d 301, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Section 794.0115(2)(e) requires that an individual found to be a dangerous sexual felony offender “be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.”2 Section 794.0115(6) further provides:

(6) Notwithstanding s. 775.082(3), chapter 958, any other law, or any interpretation or construction thereof, a person subject to sentencing under this section must be sentenced to the mandatory term of imprisonment provided under this section. If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the sentence imposed must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section.

(Emphasis added).

Here, Wilkerson was convicted under section 800.04(4)(b), a second-degree felony, generally punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years. See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2012). Section 794.0115(6) provides that when, as here, the mandatory minimum under section 794.0015 (twenty-five years) exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under section 775.082 (fifteen years), the mandatory minimum must be imposed. Thus, while we conclude the trial court was required to impose the twenty-five year minimum sentence, the life sentence was unauthorized.

For these reasons, we affirm Wilkerson’s conviction, but remand for correction of sentence. Since the only lawful sentence that can be imposed under the circumstances is the twenty-five year minimum mandatory prison term required by section 794.0115(6), Wilkerson need not be present at resentencing.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED for correction of sentence.

TORPY, C.J., and EVANDER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. State, 189 So. 3d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
    …MAKAR, J., concurring. I concur fully, noting that the Fifth District’s decision, in Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), cannot stand unless our supreme court revisits and changes course from its decision in Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 750 (Fla.2010), whose holding our court applied to validate the trial court’s discretionary imposition of…
    1 / 3
  • Baxter v. State, 206 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
    …sonment,” we hold that Mr. Baxter’s sentence is legal. Accordingly, -we agree with the First District’s decision in Williams v. State, 189 So. 3d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and certify conflict with the Fifth District’s decision in Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). Mr. Baxter was convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child twelve years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment. See §§ 775.082(3)(c)…
  • Williams v. State, 232 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2017)
    …A 2016), in which the First District Court of Appeal held that the DSFO Act authorizes a mandatory minimum life sentence regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime. In so holding, the First District certified conflict with Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that' when the statutory maximum for a particular crime is less than twenty-five years, the DSFO Act authorizes a trial court to impose only a mandatory minimum term of twent…

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